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ABSTRACT 
Today's business environment is the most volatile in history. Many markets have 
become increasingly competitive due to slowing economic growth, maturing end-use 
industries, and heightened overseas competition. Expansion of existing businesses has 
occurred mainly through market share gains. 
As a result of increased competition, competitor intelligence has become a 
valuable analytical tool in the strategic planning process. Competitive intelligence has 
been defined as the use of sources available to develop information on competition, 
competitors, and the environment in which the competition is being waged. Three 
sources of competitor information have been identified: what competitors say about 
themselves, what others such as analysts, clients, and the press say about competitors, 
and what individuals within the organization have observed. 
A common organizational response to the increased need for competitor 
information has been to create a formal competitor intelligence system. The purpose 
of this project was to provide companies and information professionals, in particular, 
with a framework for designing and implementing such a system. 
The particular structure chosen for the competitive intelligence process is dependent 
upon several factors, among them the decisions that intelligence is to support, the 
available resources for the intelligence task on both the corporate and business unit 
levels, the organizational structure of the company, and the prevailing corporate 
culture. 
In addition to delineating the domain of competitor intelligence, an array of 
external and internal data sources have been identified along with the essential 
elements or critical items of information needed for developing competitor profiles and 
analyses. Strategies for collecting and organizing resources have been devised and the 
vehicles for retrieving and disseminating competitive intelligence products have been 
established. Moreover, this project has shown how competitor intelligence can be 
integrated into an organization's strategic planning process through activities such as 
shadow marketing, benchmarking, and reverse engineering. 
Intelligence has become a key management tool for corporate chief executives and 
policymakers. The development of competitor intelligence and the subsequent 
emergence of competitor intelligence systems has provided companies with not only the 
means to obtain new ideas and predict the future better but also the ability to manage, 
understand, and accept change more readily. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
By the modern rules of business, companies must take clients and profits away 
from the competition to survive. In previous decades when most markets were 
expanding, many companies could sustain sales growth merely by maintaining constant 
market share. The 1980s, however, have been different. Many markets have exhibited 
no growth or are declining. 
In recent years, unpredictable changes in regulatory, technological, and social 
environments have affected corporate strategic planning. In their article, "Building 
Effective Intelligence Systems for Competitive Advantage," Sumantra Ghoshal and Seok 
Ki Kim identified three phenomena which seem to have played a critical role in making 
corporate executives realize that changes in the business environment must be 
monitored. 
First, the trend of global competition, which emerged in the 1970s, has become 
increasingly dominant in the 1980s. Most medium and large businesses are now 
required to contend with foreign competitors who have different administrative, cultural 
and physical resource bases and competencies. Such competition among firms with 
vastly different societal origins makes the need for environmental intelligence more 
compelling and complex. When competitors are based in the same country, a number of 
factors need not be monitored because they are common, and therefore, any change 
affects all competitors equally. Moreover, information on such factors are often 
received by firms automatically, without any conscious effort being made. However, 
with global competition, changes in exchange rates, interest rates, wage rates, or other 
public policies affect competitors differently, and therefore, need to be watched more 
carefully. 
Second, since the business environment has become more volatile, the buffer 
between a company and its environment has eroded. The shortening of product life 
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cycles, the trend toward deregulation of businesses, and increasing convergence of 
technologies have heightened the need for early detection of environmental changes 
and a quick response to those changes. For most companies, the sources of 
opportunities and threats have become more diverse, and consequently, the range of 
organizations and environmental variables to be monitored have broadened. 
Lastly, in most industries, major competitors have become virtually 
indistinguishable in terms of their technological competence or their scale of 
operations. Few companies enjoy the absolute leadership role they benefited from a 
decade ago. The "catch-up" phenomenon has exposed industry leaders to increasing 
competition to such an extent that durable competitive advantages have become more 
and more difficult to achieve. Relative competitive positions are now determined not 
on the basis of technological or commercial breakthroughs, but on the basis of how 
well companies can cope with the current wave of change. 
ST ATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Despite the fact that companies are engaged in a continuous, dynamic struggle 
with inter- and intra-industry competitors for clients, profits, and market share, few 
companies study their competitors as closely as they scrutinize their own internal 
operations and resources. When senior executives attempt to add a competitive 
perspective to their company's strategic planning process, they often discover that 
knowledge of key competitors is extremely incomplete, widely scattered throughout the 
corporation, and generally uncoordinated. Moreover, in the complex organizations that 
characterize most large corporations, information about competitors is sometimes 
suppressed or manipulated to protect subordinate vested interests within the company. 
Thus, while an increasing number of staff and line groups may be collecting 
disparate kinds of information about competitors, the strategic value of this data is not 
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realized by the corporation as a whole. The net result is a debilitating strategic 
intelligence situation in which senior management is intermittently showered with 
selective items of competitive data that, in their unorganized form, frequently distort 
rather than clarify the true features of the competitive environment confronting the 
corporation. 
Faced with this perceptual dilemma and recognizing the growing need for more 
complete information, executives in a number of companies have begun to set up 
programs to organize and disseminate their company's intelligence resources. When 
the corporation's intelligence resources are identified and centrally coordinated, a 
higher quality of timely competitive intelligence is possible. Moreover, by collecting, 
organizing, and communicating a larger body of competitor information, the 
intelligence most relevant to the company's strategic situation can be extracted and 
converted into a valuable analytical resource for key decision-makers. 
BACKGROUND 
Competitive intelligence is the use of sources available to develop information on 
competition, competitors, and the environment in the market in which the competition 
is being waged. Competitive intelligence, however, is not market research. It is an 
in-depth step beyond straightforward market research that considers as well strategies 
and policies, products and services, sales, finances, technology, and perceptions of the 
candidate by its competitors and clients. 
Tamar and Benjamin Gilad in their book, The Business Intelligence System, stated 
that competitive intelligence is a process, an organizational function, and a product. 
The product of competitor intelligence is best defined, according to the Gilads, as 
processed information of interest to management about the present and future 
environment in which the business is operating. The authors concluded that while this 
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definition may be broad, it nevertheless, captures the essence of competitive 
intelligence. First, the emphasis is on processed information. It is distinguished 
between data, the raw material that is composed of facts, and intelligence, which is 
information digested, analyzed, and interpreted for the purpose of decision-making. 
Second, the definition also points to management as having a critical role in competitor 
intelligence. By identifying what information is relevant or of interest to their 
decisions, the company's key executives ultimately determine the domain of competitive 
intelligence. Third, competitor intelligence is concerned with the company's business 
environment, both the present (tactical intelligence) and the future (strategic 
in telligence). 
More precisely, intelligence has come to mean information that not only has been 
selected and collected, but also analyzed, evaluated, and distributed to meet the unique 
policymaking needs of an organization. In his book, Real-World Intelligence, Herbert 
Meyer purported that in the hands of policymakers who know where they want to go, 
whose strategic planning units have outlined a clear set of objectives, intelligence has 
become a tool of awesome power and flexibility. Having access to organized 
information, the managers of any kind of business can see what is going on right now, 
and more importantly, they can see what is likely to go in the hours, weeks, months, 
and years to come. As Meyer aptly noted, foreknowledge of this sort does not 
necessarily guarantee success, but it at least increases the chances of success. 
Intelligence, according to Meyer, is nothing less than the crucial second half of 
strategic planning. It is the mechanism which enables a company that has a strategic 
plan to chart and pursue a course that will bring the company to its objectives in the 
shortest possible time, no matter how rapidly or radically external conditions may 
change. When external conditions change so radically that the plan itself needs to be 
altered, it is intelligence that sounds the first alert. Potential problems will become 
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apparent much sooner, thus allowing more time for evasive action. Potential 
opportunities will also become visible much sooner, allowing time for sharp, aggresive 
thrusts that carry a business forward along its chosen course. 
Thus, intelligence work is the art of fitting together various pieces of seemingly 
disconnected information to build a coherent picture of what competitors are doing. 
Today some companies are relying on such "Star Wars" technology as satellite 
photography, electronic surveillance, and sophisticated computer models to collect 
competitive intelligence on everything from employee work patterns to resource 
management. These companies perceive that the more volatile the marketplace, the 
greater the need for detailed, accurate information on a competitor's activities. 
Though competitive intelligence may bring to mind such "cloak and dagger" 
images, in reality, corporate information is more often given away than stolen. Most 
of the desired information is free and publicly available. Yet, when methodically 
assembled and interpreted, it can help a company develop competitive strategies in such 
areas as pricing, product and service design, advertising, and marketing. Thus, 
competitive intelligence is much like solving a jigsaw puzzle. Each piece of 
information is reviewed, analyzed, and added to the overall picture. 
In their article, "Hefting the Data Load: How to Design the MkIS that Works for 
You," V an Ma yros and Dennis Dolan observed that competitor intelligence systems not 
only complement traditional management information systems by underscoring the 
interdependence of all the company's functions but also link the information needed for 
"doing things right" with information that indicates if the organization is "doing the 
right things." Moreover, competitor intelligence systems provide quicker recognition of 
forces and events affecting the company's performance as well as serve as a strategic 
planning database allowing faster, more accurate evaluation of strategic options. 
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From a corporate standpoint, better access to information both horizontally and 
vertically allows management to avoid surprises and identify opportunities for 
competitive advantage. The key to long turn success, concluded the authors, is the 
creation of a competitor intelligence system which delivers better, more actionable 
information than the competition. 
PURPOSE 
The scope and complexity of competitor intelligence, as well as its relative 
immaturity as an organizational activity, are evident in the fact that none of the 
articles and books written on the topic cover all of its concerns. Six concerns have 
been identified: (1) what is competitor intelligence; (2) what data are required; (3) 
what are the relevant data sources; (4) what is the best way to collect the data; (5) 
how should the data be analyzed; (6) how can competitor intelligence be integrated into 
an organization's strategic planning process. 
Previously, most authors have focused almost exclusively on the methods of 
gathering intelligence or on identifying potential sources of competitor intelligence. 
Practioners have shown how they do it and what the benefits are. Consultants, 
moreover, have discussed how the theory works. Some have provided an approach for 
data collection and analysis, and even fewer, have discussed how to integrate the 
information into the strategic planning process. Fewer still have offered guidance on 
how to get competitor intelligence into the mainstream of strategic and operational 
thinking and decision-making. 
Moreover, much of the literature to date regarding the subject of competitor 
intelligence has been authored by business executives, and thus, reflects the business 
viewpoint. This project has attempted to fill a much needed void in the literature by 
not only addressing all six of the concerns regarding competitor intelligence but also 
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by presenting the information professional's perspective concerning the collection, 
analysis, dissemination, and use of competitor intelligence within the corporate 
environment. 
SIGNIFICANCE 
Robert Wagers observed in his article, "Online Sources of Competitive 
Intelligence," that interest in monitoring the competition appears to have developed 
from several causes: (1) the public availability of useful information about companies; 
(2) the spread of advice on methods of surveillance garnered from military intelligence 
and corporate spying; (3) an economic climate in which competitive advantage has 
become a daily necessity; and (4) more and more firms are gathering competitor 
information so nobody can afford to stay out of the "information arms race." 
A common organizational response to the increased need for competitor 
intelligence has been to create a formal competitor intelligence system. In their book, 
Strategic Planning Policy, William King and David Cleland purported that the objectives 
of such a system are four fold: (1) to assure the availability on a timely basis of 
credible and comprehensive information regarding the capabilities of, and the options 
open to, each key competitor; (2) to determine the manner in which competitors' 
actions might affect current organizational interests; (3) to continuously monitor and 
provide information on situations in the competitive environment that might have an 
impact on the interests of the organization; and (4) to achieve efficiency and eliminate 
unnecessary duplication of effort for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
competitive intelligence for the organization. 
Sumantra Ghoshal and Seok Ki Kim stated in their article, "Building Effective 
Intelligence Systems for Competitive Advantage," that in effect, such a system divides 
the intelligence function into two distinct components: one for monitoring the specific 
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business situation; the other for analyzing the overall business climate. Information 
about the immediate business environment, current competitors, and the market in 
which a company operates is required on a day-to-day basis for making operational and 
tactical decisions. Information about the broader environment, about general economic, 
political, and social changes is utilized primarily for long-range strategic planning. 
The authors went on to note that although the distinction between the two types of 
information may be unclear and there may be overlap, a distinction must be made, 
nevertheless, since the methods for acquiring and interpreting the intelligence differ. 
First, the information sources are different. Information about the immediate 
business environment is usually available only from business associates. Some 
information is available from public sources but by the time it is published, it is also 
less useful. However, information about broad changes is most efficiently obtained 
from sources available in the public domain. 
Second, individuals acquiring the two types of information are different. 
Information on the immediate business environment can be acquired only by those 
executives who have direct access and are connected to the industry network. 
Individuals who acquire general information are specially trained to know the specific 
sources that are most useful for particular kinds of information. A special intelligence 
staff that has the academic training, analytical skills, and access to these sources can 
fulf ill this function. 
Third, the information-acquisition process is different. Specific task-related 
information is usually acquired by chance, in the course of a discussion with clients, or 
with an informal contact in a competing company. General environmental intelligence 
is usually acquired through an active search which is more directed and focused than 
the relatively passive task-related information. 
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The needs for intelligence differ according to the operation being planned. A 
company may have long-range plans, tactical or short-range plans, and immediate 
operations, all of which require intelligence support. Thus, to be effective and useful, 
the competitor intelligence system requires information that is collected by individuals 
throughout the entire organization. 
ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMIT A TIONS 
The construction of a viable competitor intelligence system is exceedingly complex 
due to the unstructured nature of strategic decisions, the difficulty of separating out 
important and relevant information from the vast amounts of data accessible to 
executives, and the reliance of executives on personal information sources. Moreover, 
since the tasks and the organization of corporate intelligence system are novel, 
and in some respects alien, concepts to most American companies, there is relatively 
little public information available on how to structure, operate, and integrate 
competitor oriented business intelligence into the corporate planning process. 
As firms vary in their management style, corporate culture, size, and structure, 
their competitor intelligence systems also vary. The question of where in the 
organization competitor intelligence should take place depends upon the decisions that 
competitor intelligence is to support, on available resources, and on the organizational 
structure and culture of the company. 
Accordingly, when structuring a competitor intelligence system there are several 
variables that should be considered. These include: (1) assessing the availability and 
location of personnel and resources; (2) identifying the information needs of various 
business units and executives within the company; and (3) determining what operating 
and strategic planning decisions can be supported with competitor intelligence. 
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Thus, a clear understanding of organizational, financial, informational, time, and 
legal constraints is necessary in creating a competitor intelligence system. Such 
constraints often limit the flexibility of the system by restricting the range and extent 
of actions that may occur. Further, they establish boundaries which help to determine 
the competitive analysis tasks. In particular, the cost of acquiring the necessary 
information is a constraint which cannot be overlooked. Thus, trade-offs have to be 
made regarding the comprehensiveness and quality of information. 
An appropriate basis for assessing the value of competitor analysis, according to 
Daniel Smith and John Prescott in their article, "Demystifying Competitive Analysis," is 
to evaluate the costs and benefits of having the intelligence. These costs include both 
the expense associated with gathering information and any loss of opportunity while 
awaiting for the analysis to be completed. The benefits depend upon the size of the 
investment and the extent to which managers are uncertain about which alternative is 
best. In essence, the value of competitive intelligence can be measured by comparing 
cost to the likelihood of making the wrong decision. Thus, some competitive 
intelligence activities cost nothing, some require only a modest investment, while still 
others cannot be done at any price, even by the largest of companies. 
SUMMARY 
Throughout the business community, "intelligence" is on its way to becoming a 
key management tool for corporate executives and key decision-makers. The 
development of competitor intelligence and the subsequent emergence of competitor 
intelligence systems is the most striking and potentially the most important business 
trend in recent time. Today most large companies have several intelligence activities 
underway, including market research, political risk analysis, economic forecasting, and a 
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wide range of technologically oriented activities such as benchmarking and reverse 
engineering. 
Within a small but growing number of companies, all the scattered and often 
uncollected intelligence-type activities already underway are being pulled together into 
a tightly organized, or at least coordinated corporate unit. It is this concerted effort 
to acquire, organize, and coordinate the diverse elements of intelligence that is turning 
a group of related but previously separate activities into a wholly new and incredibly 
powerful business management tool. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
While still only in its infant stage in the United States, competitor analysis has 
been a standard business practice in foreign countries for decades. Stimulated by 
Michael Porter's book, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors, the information consciousness of the American business community has 
been raised in recent years by a proliferation of articles and books written on the 
topic of competitor intelligence. 
Porter's approach to competitor analysis emphasized the need to understand a 
competitor's assumptions about itself and the industry in which it competes. As he 
pointed out, too often, managers incorrectly assume that counterparts in competing 
firms are driven by the same set of variables and view the world from a similar 
perspective. Understanding a competitor's assumptions, he added, is one of the most 
challenging intelligence tasks due to the fact that it requires an insightful evaluation 
of the competitor's value system, organizational culture, and historical pattern of 
behavior. It is this qualitative kind of competitor intelligence that is rare in most 
corporations, where the strategic focus tends to be on quantifiable facts which detail a 
competitor's observable business strengths and weaknesses. 
Porter also advanced the notion that competition in any industry is rooted in its 
underlying economic structure and is far more than a game of moves and 
countermoves among participating companies. This approach is reflected in the 
framework he proposed to explain the dynamics of competition in an industry. Porter 
identified five major competitive forces: (1) the threat of new entrants; (2) the 
intensity of rivalry among existing competitors; (3) pressure from substitute products; 
(4) the bargaining power of buyers; and (5) the bargaining power of suppliers. 
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An important implication of this framework is the idea of extended rivalry. To 
understand competition in an industry, Porter maintained, one must look beyond current 
competitors to include clients, suppliers, companies producing substitute products, and 
poten tial en tran ts. 
Although the number of specific strategies available to a competitor might, in 
some instances, appear to be nearly infinite, Porter concluded that companies can 
reduce all the ways of competing into three generic strategies: overall cost leadership, 
differentiation, and focus. The low cost producer, stated Porter, functions across the 
entire market and emphasizes having the lowest cost structure in the industry. The 
differentiated competition, by contrast, concentrates on providing greater value. 
Porter's third category of strategy is the competitor that focuses on dominating a 
particular market. 
M.H. Notowidigdo further elaborated on this point in his article, "Information 
Systems: Weapons to Gain the Competitive Edge." In the overall cost leadership 
strategy, a company usually has a strong cost leadership orientation, structured 
organization and responsibilities, and greater access to capital than other firms. The 
organization that adopts a product/service differentiation, on the other hand, tends to 
have a strong marketing capacity, a reputation for quality, creative instincts, and a 
long tradition in the industry. Those companies that focus on a segmentation strategy 
represent a combination of the two traits but have a high degree of concentration 
toward a particular target market. 
As William King observed in his article, "The New Strategic Business Resource: 
Information," Porter's first two business strategies usually rely on something other than 
information. Cost leadership may be based on experience curve effects or lower than 
average wage rates. Differentiation may be based on superior quality, design, or 
technology. However, Porter's third strategy, focus, may well be achieved by using 
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superior information. For example, a company that performs a market segmentation 
analysis focusing upon a particular product/service line, distribution channel, or 
geographic area is seeking a local competitive advantage based on its superior 
information about the unfulfilled needs of that segment. So too is a firm that finds a 
market niche by using information to identify the special needs of a particular group 
of clients. 
As King indicated, the notion of an information-based comparative advantage is 
not new, but the idea of systematically developing information and information systems 
as a potential source of competitive business advantage is a novel approach. 
DOMAIN OF COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE 
In many companies today, competitive intelligence functions as a formal 
information system that allows management to monitor the world outside of the 
organization. As management information systems formalize information for internal 
operations management, competitive intelligence systems formalize information for 
tactical and strategic management. As Dominick Attanasio stated in his article, 
"The Multiple Benefits of Competitor Intelligence," the prime objectives of competitive 
intelligence are threefold: (1) to identify a competitor's weaknesses and thereby, 
provide new market share opportunities; (2) anticipate a competitor's market thrust; 
and (3) react more quickly and effectively to changes in the market itself. 
According to Attanasio, competitive intelligence can be viewed from different 
perspectives as well: (1) in terms of business time--operations intelligence, tactical 
intelligence, and strategic intelligence; (2) from the perspective of users--corporate 
management, strategic business unit management, and operational management within 
the business unit; and (3) from the perspective of the external environment--the 
industry, the industry's competitors, and the consumer market. 
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In their book, The Business Intelligence System, Tamar and Benjamin Gilad 
indicated that the purpose of a formal competitive intelligence system is to shift the 
emphasis from reliance on short-term tactical intelligence to better use of strategic 
intelligence in the decision-making process. Strategic intelligence, according to the 
Gilads, calls for a greater scope, depth, and sophistication of input and analysis than 
tactical intelligence. Strategic intelligence requires the institutionalization of the 
competitive intelligence process, or the building of a business intelligence system as a 
legitimate organizational resource. 
As the Gilads pointed out, in nearly every firm, whether large or small, 
executives and employees engage in some form of intelligence gathering. Informal 
intelligence is inexpensive in terms of operating and set-up costs. It does not require 
any special personnel training, outside consulting, or organizational change. Moreover, 
in many organizations, the informal collection of competitor intelligence is conducted 
by executives as an automatic step before major decisions are made, as a side activity 
of their interaction with peers and subordinates, or as a spontaneous reaction to their 
daily reading of published material. 
The major problem with informal intelligence, according to the Gilads, is that it 
is not a coordinated, systematic organizational function. Rather than being a powerful 
competitive resource, information that may be crucial to decisions may be overlooked 
when subjected to unsystematic, discontinuous monitoring. Another drawback is that in 
an informal, uncoordinated system, duplication of efforts and wasting of resources may 
result since several people in the organization may be collecting, but not sharing, the 
same information. However, a formal competitor intelligence system, permits the 
regular and continual collection, analysis, and reporting of intelligence by individuals 
throughout the organization. The formalizing of competitor intelligence, stated the 
Gilads, increases the supply of intelligence, both in quality and quantity. The quantity 
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increases due to the rising awareness by employees while, at the same time, the quality 
improves because the collection of information is targeted. 
ORGANIZATION OF COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE 
The question many companies face today is not whether to systematize the 
intelligence operation, but what the best organizational solution to the system should 
be. The process of competitor intelligence requires that management identify the tasks 
that must be undertaken as well as the sequence in which they are to be completed. 
The question then becomes how to assign responsibilities for executing such tasks. 
The implementation of a competitive intelligence system varies from company to 
company and depends upon the goals of the system, corporate structure, and resource 
limitations. Differences in the organizational implementation of a competitor 
intelligence system typically relate to the centralization/decentralization of the 
acti vi ties. 
In their article, "Business Intelligence: The Quiet Revolution," Tamar and 
Benjamin Gilad described five generic organizational structures for competitive 
intelligence. Under the departmental organizational structure, competitive intelligence 
is a fragmented function, carried out within several departments and serving the needs 
of that department only. Thus, market research personnel will conduct market studies 
for the sales and marketing department, while the research and development department 
will track technological developments for its own needs and purposes. 
In a decentralized system, each business unit, subsidiary, or division is in charge 
of its own system. One person or small group is responsible for managing all aspects 
of the function. Targets and priorities are determined by the division alone and only 
some final intelligence output relevant to corporate interests goes to the planning 
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group and to management at the corporate level. Moreover, in a decentralized system, 
business units rarely share information with each other. 
On the other hand, in a centralized system, there is one competitor intelligence 
unit that serves the total company. This unit manages the collection of data, performs 
evaluation and analysis, disseminates intelligence reports to all interested users within 
the organization, and maintains a centralized storage and retrieval system. 
In the support approach, as in the decentralized system, competitor intelligence is 
decentralized and each business unit provides its own intelligence information. This 
structure differs from the decentralized system in that there also exists a corporate 
intelligence unit. Its function is mainly to serve in an educational and advisory role to 
the business units and to assist them in setting up their own intelligence operations. 
It may also engage in actual intelligence work, supplying intelligence relevant to 
corporate targets that may differ from the needs of any specific business unit. The 
complex structure includes a combination of intelligence activities conducted on the 
business unit level and on the corporate level. The corporate intelligence unit 
typically serves the entire organization and provides business units with intelligence 
that is common to all of them. At the same time, business units will have intelligence 
functions which concentrate on their own specific needs. The corporate unit also 
coordina tes the total organiza tiona! process. In this ca paci ty, its tasks are similar to 
those of the competitor intelligence unit described in the support approach. Moreover, 
the unit coordinates the sharing of intelligence generated by business units and 
functional departments. 
As the Gilads aptly pointed out, the question of whether to centralize or 
decentralize the intelligence activities is a critical one. The issue is important because 
a company creating a centralized unit to serve the whole corporation may encounter a 
variety of problems and obstacles. For example, the analysis produced by corporate 
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analysts in a centralized unit that is shared with all divisions may, in fact, be 
considered irrelevant by the divisions. A corporate unit may be able to serve the 
needs of top managers because of its ability to gain the larger view of the competitive 
environment. At the same time, however, it may have difficulty serving the needs of 
the divisions which may require more detail about the short term developments in their 
specific marketplaces. This may result not only in analysis which is neither geared to 
the needs of the division nor hardly used by divisional managers but also a reluctance 
on the part of the business units to allocate resources for corporate intelligence 
projects. 
A related problem is the tendency to standardize the intelligence. For firms 
operating in different industries, different markets, and different countries, such 
standardization may not be appropriate. In addition, the expertise of a centrally 
located staff may be limited in scope, particularly if they are to track the numerous 
competitors of a company which is a conglomerate of unrelated businesses. The staff 
may be well versed in the latest competitive analysis theories but lack the knowledge 
of the day-to-day realities facing the industries and the competitors they monitor. 
A decentralized system may also pose problems as well. An intelligence system 
that serves the needs of the division in a decentralized system may not afford the 
strategic point of view necessary for the corporate parent. Thus, the intelligence 
needs of the corporation as a whole may not be met by a completely decentralized 
system. In addition, divisions, especially if they are small, lack the resources and staff 
needed to run the intelligence activity in a formal manner. Moreover, there may be a 
duplication of effort between several divisions, especially if they have the same 
competitors. 
Despite the problems and obstacles, there are, nonetheless, advantages to a 
centralized intelligence system. First, the centralized system offers a strategic 
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corporate overview that enables it to respond quickly to the needs of top management. 
Second, if the corporation consists of divisions that face similar competitors or operate 
in similar markets, the unit may well serve all the divisions more than adequately. 
Third, duplication of effort is reduced and a specialized computerized storage system 
can be developed to disseminate and share competitive information and profiles by all 
business units. 
Under the appropriate circumstances, there can be distinct advantages to a 
decentralized system as well. First, if the division has its own intelligence operations, 
questions and needs can be answered faster and fewer conflicts may arise over 
priorities. Analysts become more knowledgeable about the industry, product lines, and 
competitors of the division. Another advantage is that intelligence personnel are 
closer to the collection network and can more easily control and direct the flow of 
data. 
The Gilads proposed that the support approach, a variant of the decentralized 
system, attempts to correct some of the problems previously described by incorporating 
a central intelligence function. In addition to competitive intelligence carried out by 
each individual division, an intelligence unit limited in size is established at the 
corporate level. Its main mission is to provide support to the divisional functions, 
where the main effort is carried out. The corporate unit is responsible for educating 
employees throughout the corporation about competitive intelligence as well as for 
serving as quality control to the intelligence activities at the divisional level. Quality 
control, moreover, is achieved by setting standards for the entire system. These 
standards apply to the determination of intelligence targets, the modes of reporting 
intelligence, accountability, and evaluation procedures. In addition, this unit also 
provides collection, evaluation, and analysis services to corporate management. 
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In large, diversified, and organizationally complex corporations, the intelligence 
System may also take on a complicated structure. The solution for such a company 
may be to combine decentralized structural elements with a centralized intelligence 
function. In such a setup, divisional units cater to their own divisional intelligence 
needs while, at the same time, a central unit caters to corporate needs, provides 
intelligence services common to all of the divisions, and serves as a company-wide 
intelligence coordinator. 
As the Gilads also indicated, the particular structure chosen for the competitive 
intelligence process is contingent upon several factors, among them the decisions that 
the intelligence is to support, the available resources for the intelligence task on both 
the corporate and business unit levels, the organizational structure of the company, 
and the prevailing corporate culture. Hence, in organizing the intelligence system, the 
particular solution for each company depends upon its own unique circumstances. 
The Gilads warned that a system that is too heavily formalized and regulated 
lacks flexibility and simplicity. A rigid system, moreover, cannot scan the broader 
environment for unpredictable opportunities and will take a long time to adjust to 
changing needs. Too complex a system can also discourage employees from collecting 
and communicating data. The solutions are to avoid creating new communication 
procedures if it is possible to use existing ones as well as to be flexible in methods of 
reporting. End-users should be consulted regularly on their intelligence needs and, 
above all, companies should create an intelligence product that can adapt to these 
changing needs. 
The location of the intelligence function within the organization's hierarchy and 
the position of responsibility for the activity also vary considerably from one firm to 
another. There are units staffed with information professionals who report to middle-
level managers while, at the same time, there are systems where the intelligence units, 
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composed primarily of marketing and financial analysts, report to an executive just 
below the president. Moreover, there are intelligence functions where the division 
president is the chief intelligence officer. The higher the unit is situated in the 
organization, according to the Gilads, the more visibility, prestige, credibility, and 
influence it can have and the more effective it can be in securing cooperation from 
the total organization. Conversely, if the function is too low in the organization, it is 
unlikely to obtain an appropriate budget, provide the needed perspective to its 
intelligence product, or gain enough support to survive. 
In How to Analyze the Competition, Ivan Campbell Smith indicated that it is 
difficult to assess the specific cost of developing and maintaining a competitor 
intelligence system. Expenditures on competitor intelligence activities often include 
salaries for analysts, computer resources, publications and other sources of information, 
and miscellaneous administrative expenses. He purported that the total cost of the 
system should be between one-quarter and one-half of one percent of sales. However, 
the budget for the system should not be determined solely on the basis of the 
percentage of revenues but on the magnitude of the tasks to be performed. In other 
words, the budget should not drive the plan but rather the plan should drive the 
budget. In essence, not allocating a sufficient budget for competitor intelligence 
activities can ultimately cost the company more than a proper budget would have. 
These costs can be hidden in terms of lost opportunities that result from a poor 
understanding of the company's environment as well as the inability to anticipate 
competitors' moves and actions. 
As William Sammon stated in the book, Business Competitor Intelligence, once 
authority and responsibility for the system have been determined, there are seven steps 
to implementing a competitor intelligence and analysis program. These steps include: 
(1) identifying specific competitors; (2) determining what is needed to be known about 
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each competitor; (3) identifying both print and online sources of information; 
(4) organizing the resources and devising a strategy for obtaining the information; 
(5) integrating the information from all sources, analyzing the data, and assessing the 
competitors' potential performance versus the forecasts of the company; (6) identifying 
and evaluating current and possible strategies of the competitors and designing 
effective plans in response to them; and (7) monitoring the competitors' actions so that 
management can alter its operations accordingly. 
COMPETITOR MONITORING AND ANALYSIS 
From a strategic perspective, management usually needs intelligence for two 
general purposes: environmental scanning and competitor analysis. Environmental 
scanning includes market research and industry analysis, public policy analysis, and 
macroeconomic analysis. Competitor analysis, on the other hand, examines the current 
strategies and performance of specific competitors in relation to the company. 
Although some may regard competitor analysis as a subcomponent of environmental 
scanning, Sammon contended that it is more advisable to identify it as a separate and 
distinct analytical effort in order to ensure that it is given the strategic priority that 
it requires. 
In his article, "Competitor Analysis: The Missing Link in Strategy," William 
Rothschild indicated that competition comes in many shapes and forms. First, there is 
competition for clients' discretionary and nondiscretionary dollars for products or 
services. A second way to examine the competition is to develop a demographic profile 
of each competitor. Industries dominated by small single-industry specialists or small 
regional companies, for instance, are significantly different from those led by multi-
industry companies, and these, in turn, are different from multinational or foreign 
companies. Finally, a third view of competitors focuses on potential changes within 
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companies which may elect to increase their current role and become direct 
competitors. These companies may at present be suppliers, distributors, or perhaps, 
even clients. 
In their article, "Designing Organizations to Compete," Ian MacMillan and Patricia 
Jones contended that competitive analysis must begin with the identification of the 
"real" target competitors. These are competitors whose strategic weaknesses render 
them most vulnerable to the company's strategy. If the company has a strategy that is 
based on a competitive advantage in a particular area of service, then clearly the brunt 
of the attack will be borne initially on those firms that are weak in that area, not on 
those that are strong. If none are weak, then the company is not undertaking an 
attack, but a defense. 
John McGonagle, Jr. further elaborated on this point in his article, "Using 
Defensive Competitor Intelligence in Mergers and Acqusitions." McGonagle asserted 
that the difference between offensive and defensive use of competitive intelligence is 
subtle, but nevertheless, critical. Using competitive intelligence offensively may mean 
tracking the activities of potential merger and acquisition targets on a regular basis, 
for instance, as well as developing profiles of their current activities in the market. 
Defensive competitive intelligence, on the other hand, means monitoring and evaluating 
the company's own business activities as competitors and others perceive them. Thus, 
defensive competitive intelligence is not an evaluation of what the company can do or 
is doing but rather how others see the company's business, even if that perception is 
mistaken. 
David Montgomery and Charles Weinberg also discussed defensive and offensive 
competitive intelligence in their article, "Toward Strategic Intelligence Systems." They 
asserted that defensive intelligence is oriented towards avoiding surprises. A company 
plans and manages itself on the basis of certain implicit and explicit assumptions about 
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the market. A properly designed competitive intelligence program should continually 
monitor the market to ensure that these assumptions continue to hold or trigger a 
warning if a major change or threat occurs. Offensive intelligence, however, is 
designed to identify opportunities to increase profits or market share. Armed with the 
knowledge that a competitor is experiencing financial cutbacks, employee layoffs, or 
reorganization, a company may be in a position to take advantage of the situation. 
Montgomery and Weinberg also presented a third type of intelligence, passive 
intelligence, which is designed to provide benchmark data for the objective evaluation 
of the company's performance in relation to the competition. 
Barbie Keiser, in her article, "Practical Competitor Intelligence," indicated that 
the ultimate objective of an organized competitor intelligence system is to gather 
today's information in order to anticipate what competitors will do tomorrow. In 
addition to merely identifying competitors, a company must also select both the 
qualitative and quantitative information needed to identify competitors' current or 
potential strategies. The competitor intelligence system, Keiser asserted, must be 
designed not only to provide easy access to the facts about competitors, but more 
importantly, to help the company understand what the competition is doing and why it 
works. 
According to Ian Gordon in his article, "Competitive Intelligence: A Key to 
Marketplace Survival," information about competitors comes in three forms: what 
competitors say about themselves, what others say about the competitors, and what 
individuals within the organization have observed. Third parties who function as useful 
information sources can be further divided into two categories: those individuals who 
study competitors as part of their work, such as stock brokers, financial analysts, or 
consultants, and those who understand competitors because of their business links, such 
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as sales personnel, suppliers, previous employees, or clients. A list of these sources is 
found in Exhibit I. 
In the book, Business Competitor Intelligence, William Sammon warned that once 
competitors have been identified, the inclination to collect everything about them must 
be resisted. Focus is required both to control the collection of information as well as 
to use intelligence resources in the most cost-effective manner. Essential elements, or 
critical items of information regarding competitors and their environment, narrow the 
competitive intelligence requirements into a set of priorities. If management's 
intelligence requirements are defined in terms of an agreed-upon competitor analysis 
framework, converting intelligence requirements to specific elements of information will 
be simplified. Exhibit II provides examples of essential elements of information. 
Benjamin and Tamar Gilad noted in their book, The Business Intelligence System, 
that analysis is the process by which large amounts of data are evaluated and 
condensed to a form that can be easily and feasibly used in the decision-making 
process. The format should be directly usable in both the day-to-day decisions and the 
strategic planning process. The purpose of the analysis is to make information more 
compact, condensed, meaningful, and easy to access and absorb. There are several 
tasks within the analysis process. They are not necessarily consecutive or independent 
of each other, but they help define the nature of analysis. 
According to the Gilads, the analysis process consists of six tasks: (1) collating 
data; (2) condensing information; (3) drawing conclusions; (4) building scenarios; 
(5) studying implications for competitive positioning; and (6) suggesting 
recommendations for action. The first step requires that related data be collated. 
That is, discrete pieces of data are assembled to provide information building blocks. 
For example, all data concerning a competitors' facilities are included in one category. 
This category contains all of the specific details available about the facilities' size, 
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location, number of employees, products/services, and any other pertinent data. The 
next step involves condensing the information since so many bits and pieces of data 
are difficult to handle individually. Once the information has been categorized and 
condensed, conclusions may be drawn. It is then useful to develop several possible 
scenarios of competitors actions and responses. This paves the way to assessing the 
company's own competitive position. Finally, the analysis is followed by 
recommendations for action resulting from the assessment of the competitive 
positioning. 
The separation of the analysis tasks into its component parts shows that there is 
more to competitive analysis than the creation of a profile consisting merely of a 
laundry list of the competitor's assets. Thus, the analysis task, is actually a group of 
tasks, each of which requires an increasing degree of skill and knowledge about the 
competitive environment. 
As Zane Markowitz stated in the article, "Hidden Sector Competitor Analysis," the 
triangulation approach to competitive analysis requires the development of three 
distinctly different types of information: profiles on all the competitors; trends in the 
sector; and opinions from consumers and suppliers. At a minimum, individual 
competitor profiles need to include descriptions of: (1) business activities -- percent 
of sales by product/service, competitor's value added, and pricing; (2) financial 
position -- sales and profitability; (3) marketing approaches -- identifying markets 
served and distribution methods; (4) competition -- names, relative market share, and 
niches; and (5) facilities -- office locations and sizes. 
In addition, exploring trends within the industry or sector can uncover issues that 
allow analysts to assess future risks. This analysis can provide an overview of: 
(1) technological trends -- new technologies, product-substitution, and process changes; 
(2) financial trends -- margins, costs, pricing, and capital expenditures; (3) marketing 
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trends -- changes in markets served, competitors' assessment of each other, and key 
success factors; and (4) growth outlook -- fastest growing markets served, fastest 
growing product areas, and potential limits to growth. 
However, knowing what competitors see for the future is not enough to truly 
assess the risks. It is also necessary, according to Markowitz, to obtain opinions from 
consumers and suppliers about each of the competitors being monitored. These 
opinions provide a reality check on the perceptions held by the competitors. The data 
needed for these consumer opinion reports include: (1) assessments of product quality, 
service, technology, and price; (2) identification of the most important factors 
considered in making purchasing decisions; (3) identification of client needs not 
currently being met; and (4) projected demands for products/services. 
As Robert Schmid, Jr. stated in his article, "Reverse Engineering a Service 
Product," the ability to use a competitor's product as a benchmark for measuring the 
design, efficiency, marketability, and cost-effectiveness of one's own product has made 
"reverse engineering" in the manufacturing industries an effective tool of product 
planners. However, when this process is translated to a service environment, the 
concept may be the same, but the process is not so obvious. A service is not 
something that can be set down on a tabletop in front of a group of engineers or 
production specialists and be dissected. A service involves skills and timing that are 
not easily quantifiable. Therefore, the conceptual part of the benchmarking process 
must be more detailed and rigorous than in a manufacturing environment. 
Benchmarking in service companies requires an ongoing strategic process that 
determines which product and which competitor should be benchmarked. Thus, an 
organization must take a realistic view of its own position, strengths, and weaknesses 
in order to target appropriate benchmarks. 
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The benefits of benchmarking in service industries, according to Schmid, are 
manifold. First, benchmarking systematically and realistically allows a company to 
determine whether a competitor's product is viable and whether it is one the company 
should introduce. Second, if the company is already offering a similar service, 
benchmarking aids in determining whether the in-house product needs to be 
reformulated or repositioned. Third, service product benchmarking can be used as a 
comparative measurement of internal performance. Fourth, competitors' products can 
be used for operational analysis. Finally, and most importantly, benchmarking adds a 
new dimension to strategic planning by giving management the idea of how competitors 
formulate and position its products based upon its strategy for the future. By working 
backward, management can counter the strategy by analyzing implicit marketing 
intentions conveyed by the firm's products. If the process by which a competitor's 
service is delivered to the public is clearly superior, more efficient, or more cost-
effective, then both the benefit of strategically planned changes in the company's 
product and an understanding of the competitor's advantages would clearly emerge from 
service benchmarking. 
Ian Gordon observed in his article, "Exit Marketing Concept - Enter Competitive 
Concept," that since the 1960s, informed executives have been guided by the marketing 
concept of identifying and satisfying consumer needs at a profit. This has led 
companies to research market and profit opportunities, reorganize and restructure 
business units, acquire and divest operations, enter new markets, and introduce new 
products. However, today many firms are finding that the marketing concept is no 
longer sufficient to secure the growth they seek. New market entrants are 
proliferating and competition now seems particularly keen. Thus, the marketing 
concept is insufficient to guide corporate direction. It lacks a competitor orientation, 
considering consumer need satisfaction in absolute terms, without consideration of the 
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degree to which competitors satisfy specific needs. Hence, the marketing concept is 
being replaced by a new orientation, the competitive concept. Gordon described this 
competitive concept as identifying consumers' needs that are either not served by 
competitors, or are inadequately or insufficiently addressed, and then satisfying these 
needs at a profit consistent with the organization's objectives. Thus, the strategic 
challenge for most firms has shifted from an absolute assessment of consumer needs to 
a two-phased approach employing both a competitor orientation and a marketplace 
focus. The competitive concept, moreover, requires that companies employ intelligence 
monitoring and analysis techniques to explore not only the consumer's mind for 
relevant needs and the degree to which competitors are satisfying them but also to 
explore the competitors' strategies as well. 
COLLECTION AND RETRIEVAL OF COMPETITIVE INFORMATION 
Sharon LaRosa aptly pointed out in her article, "Competitive Intelligence: The 
Game is Fast and Fair with Online Sleuthing," that competitive intelligence is only as 
good as the information on which it is based. Before a company can predict what its 
competitors' strategies will be, it must have timely, accurate and relevant information 
on those competitors: who they are, how they are organized, and what products and 
services they offer. The most efficient and fastest way to obtain and organize this 
information is by using online databases. Online sources can supply up-to-date 
information on public and private companies, people, products and services, and 
technologies. 
Peter McKie noted in his article, "Tracking Your Competition: The Online Edge," 
over 1500 of the 2900 online databases available worldwide provide some type of 
business-related information. Much of this information is numerical and comes from 
annual reports, analysts' reports, and government documents. A great deal of textual 
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information comes from various business publications that print articles on corporate 
strategies, products, services, management philosophies as well as the career histories 
of executives. Consequently, information can be obtained on the spot. The amount of 
time it would take to research competitors manually cannot compare to the time it 
takes electronically. In addition, information services offer a centralized information 
source, bringing together a number of different data resources that cover a broad 
range of topics. Some databases compile information from many sources, providing the 
added benefit of pooled information and expertise. 
Leslie Jacobs stated in "Searching for Industry Information," that there are two 
methods for retrieving information online. One approach is to find textual records 
about the industry per se. The second method requires retrieving several records, 
usually one record per company from a directory database and then extracting the 
necessary data from the records. This can be accomplished via user defined formats, 
or reporting features which allow the data to be aggregated into rows and columns. 
Relevant records can be retrieved from these files by searching on industry codes or 
descriptors, or by searching the names of the companies within the industry. 
However, as Robert Wagers indicated in his article, "Online Sources of 
Competitive Intelligence," despite the recent proliferation of online data, information 
about private companies, in particular, is often absent since the reporting requirements 
are not as stringent. In addition, even with daily or weekly updating, information may 
not be current enough to capture important industry changes. Moreover, data may not 
be broken down sufficiently for narrow industries or product groups with substantial 
market shares. Typically, advertisements, job announcements, and other data 
considered to be extraneous or peripheral, though critical to competitive analysis, are 
not indexed in most online databases. Wagers stated, for these reasons, online 
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searching must be placed in the context of broader intelligence operations in order for 
the system to be comprehensive and useful. 
Richard Ball indicated in his article, "Assessing Your Competitor's People and 
Organization," that conventional competitive analysis tells part of the story using 
quantitative data on competitors' market share, costs, and resources as well as 
examines more subjective issues such as the quality of marketing or sales support. 
However, strategic planning, as Ball pointed out, is a human activity. To understand 
the competition's strategic direction requires more than number crunching. Effective 
competitor analysis needs to acknowledge the human dimension and evaluate the 
contribution of such qualitative factors to corporate policy and behavior. In other 
words, what competitors are able to do on paper and what they are willing to do in 
practice is not necessarily the same thing. Aspects like corporate culture, leadership, 
and organizational effectiveness are qualitative and hard to define, yet at the same 
time, are the crux of competitive analysis. 
William Rothschild observed in his article, "Who Are Your Future Competitors?" 
that most executives tend to repeat successful strategies, even in new markets and 
business ventures. If they played an active role in implementing a particular strategy 
in the past, there is a strong possibility that they will attempt to do so again. People 
are not mechanical, yet how they think and are motivated are key considerations in 
anticipating a competitor's future direction. 
Ball further elaborated on this point and stated that it is extremely useful to 
examine an executive's career to-date, noting particularly decisions and actions that 
have brought success and therefore, may influence future choices. Profiling individual 
key executives, according to Ball, gauges the skills, experience, character traits and 
biases that might affect the competitor's performance. Included in the profiles are 
objective facts such as (1) age; (2) education; (3) career history; (4) compensation; and 
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(5) length and progress of career. Added to these resume items are any speeches or 
articles written by or about the subject as well as any other information having some 
basis in fact. 
Ball also maintained that it is worthwhile as well to develop a profile of the 
executive team by pooling and comparing the individual profiles and thereby, assessing 
how they work together as a group. Tracking the selection, retention, and movement 
of senior executives within an organization can be a useful cultural barometer to 
measure the commonality, continuity, and overall performance of the team. Using the 
individual profiles in conjunction with a chart illustrating each executive's progress, a 
picture of the type of person who advances and the type of person who may not fit 
into the organization can then be drawn. These profiles may also reveal differences in 
management skills, flexibility, values, and longetivity, thus enabling analysts to 
determine the competitor's managerial fit with the strategy it is pursuing. Hence, 
gaining insights about the competitors' human dynamics provide a more complete 
picture of their strengths and weaknesses, and armed with this knowledge, a company 
can plan its own strategy more effectively. 
As Ball noted, the availability of quantitative information has made many aspects 
of competitive analysis easier but data concerning human factors are still largely 
subjective, and therefore, must be collected piecemeal. Thus, a certain amount of 
speculation, as well as common sense evaluation, must go into the process when 
selecting and analyzing any type of competitor information. 
LEGAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Despite its legal, ethical, and public nature, competitor information must always 
be analyzed in terms of the credibility and reliability of its source and content. If the 
source is new, its reliability is difficult to determine. Moreover, there are no magical 
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solutions to the question of quality when confronted with a new source. Again, 
common sense judgments based on the motives and character of a source are the 
typical approach. Otherwise, the source has to be monitored and its performance 
assessed over time. 
In Business Competitor Intelligence, William Sammon presented an evaluation 
system which expresses the viewpoints of the collector and others using the data. The 
use of such a rating system may be the only way for the analyst to judge the 
usefulness when confronted with confirming or contradictory information. The guide is 
pres en ted below: 
Appraisal of Source 
A completely reliable 
B usually reliable 
C fairly reliable 
D not usually reliable 
E unreliable 
F reliability cannot be judged 
Appraisal of Content 
A confirmed by other means 
B probably true 
C possibly true 
D doubtful 
E improbable 
F truth cannot be determined 
In The Business Intelligence System, authors Benjamin and Tamar Gilad stated 
that the question of what is, and what is not, legal and ethical in business intelligence 
is also the question of how to distinguish industrial espionage from business 
intelligence. To clarify the distinction between the two it is necessary to define both 
activities explicitly. According to the authors, business intelligence concerns the 
ethical gathering and use of publicly or semi publicly available information as a basis 
for planning. Publicly available information refers mainly to published data to which 
the public has access. Semipublic information refers to data obtained from the field, 
such as information from clients, suppliers, and peers, among others. 
Industrial espionage, the authors asserted, is the use of illegal and unethical 
techniques to collect information, such as trade secrets, not voluntarily provided by the 
source. In business intelligence, information is collected by asking the right questions 
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to the right sources, not by coercing individuals to give answers. What is not 
provided freely by a source cannot be collected legally or ethically. There is nothing 
unethical or illegal, however, in asking Questions. The litmus test for the collector of 
intelligence is that there be no fear of public condemnation were the actions published 
on the front page of a newspaper. 
Thus, legitimate business intelligence activities do not end up in court for good 
reason. Collecting information on competitors is an accepted part of business and is 
viewed as a strategic tool by nearly all executives and companies. It is when the 
unspoken laws of business are broken that legal steps might be taken, not when the 
information is collected per se. Piecing together public and field data collected 
through monitoring and researching will hardly ever be challenged in court. 
In addition, as Leonard Fuld aptly pointed out in his book, Competitor 
Intelligence: How to Get It: How to Use It, public data does not necessarily mean 
published data. There are other sources that are publicly available, yet not in 
published form. These include: telephone interviews, attending professional association 
trade shows and meetings, or even counting the number of spaces in a competitor's 
parking lot. All of the intelligence discovered through these non-published sources is 
still valid and is very much in the public area. 
Every relevant piece of collected information must be critically assessed and then 
fitted into a larger, more meaningful whole before it can be upgraded to the category 
of competitor intelligence. The nature of the intelligence work at this stage, according 
to William Sammon in Business Competitor Intelligence, is the tedious but necessary 
task of recording the raw information as it is collected. However, the core of the 
processing phase is interpretation. Intelligence analysis is the building up, the 
layering, the overlapping, and the careful collating of disparate forms and types of 
competitor information. Primarily through the mental process of integration or the 
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combination of isolated but relevant elements of information, a logical hypothesis about 
a competitor's strategic objectives, intention, or potential is formed. As Sammon 
stated, although it is never complete or totally accurate, this kind of interpretative 
analysis will produce a systematically organized and integrated body of knowledge from 
which reasonable deductions about a competitor's probable courses of action, 
operational character, and strategies can be made. 
As Herbert Meyer noted in Real World Intelligence, one difference between failure 
and success is not how much a company knows, but rather how much it knows about 
the right things. No longer does the leading edge automatically go to whichever 
competitor has the most raw strength. It now increasingly goes to whichever 
competitor has the best vision, the better grasp of what the key trends and 
developments are, and how these trnds and developments are affecting and will affect 
all competitors. 
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPETITOR INTELLIGENCE 
Having competitor intelligence is important but unless it can be easily stored, 
maintained, and accessed, it is virtually useless. Leonard Fuld provided guidelines for 
building both manual and computerized storage systems in his book, Monitoring the 
Competition. Whether an organization chooses to build a manual file system or develop 
one electronically is dependent upon the available staff and budget in addition to 
predicted use. First, a company needs to identify user needs by determining in 
advance who will use the data and how it will be used. Knowing the "who" will 
determine the type of information to be collected and the "how" will determine the 
best way to organize the data so the user will get the most out of it. A company also 
needs to build a database or manual file which it can afford. A large database costs 
money, both in its construction and in its maintenance. Adequate staff is required for 
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data entry as well as for analysis. Moreover, information needs to be retrieved quickly 
and with minimal effort. It should be organized simply and appropriately and care 
should be taken to be selective in the types of data stored. The more data that is 
entered, the more difficult the ability to access it. Most importantly, the system needs 
to be able to pull disparate pieces of data together to present a clear picture of the 
competition. 
The final and most critical phase of the intelligence cycle is the communication 
of the intelligence to decision-makers. As Sammon indicated, dissemination is most 
effective on a "need to know" basis. This "need to know" procedure is aimed at 
avoiding the pitfalls associated with a "want to know" philosophy in which the 
tendency is to create an overload of unnecessary information and reports that busy 
executves seldom have time to read. The actual "who gets what" can be determined 
through a series of interviews designed to ascertain what specific intelligence is needed 
for decision-making, 
As Rosabeth Moss Kanter indicated in her article, "Info tech and Corporate 
Strategy," information is useless without communication. Stored information represents 
potential, but unless actively communicated, it quickly loses its value, particularly in an 
environment of rapid change. Collecting information is a worthless task, concluded 
Kanter, without a communication strategy to ensure the active attention of its users. 
Herbert Meyer maintained in his book, Real-World Intelligence, that the point of 
intelligence is to help policymakers guide their organizations to achieve their stated 
objectives, and if the conclusions of the intelligence analysts do not reach the 
policy makers, those products are of no use whatsoever. Further, to a chief executive 
whose company is collapsing around him or her, it is of little comfort to know that 
the intelligence analysts are well informed. 
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Tamar and Benjamin Gilad concluded in their book, The Business Intelligence 
System, that a system which fails to elicit the cooperation of salespeople and the 
marketing department, in particular, is not going to be very effective. Though it is 
possible to maintain an intelligence program that is largely independent of cross-
departmental communication, such as a research unit that concentrates solely on 
published sources, such a program is not transforming competitive intelligence into an 
organizational resource. Sometimes the solution is as simple as having a department 
head nominate intelligence supervisors within their department who are then responsible 
for better coordination. 
Thus, human resource commitment is vital to the success of a competitor 
intelligence system. This requires, first and foremost, demonstrating to senior 
management the link between competitive intelligence and financial performance 
improvement. To do so requires assessing the style of thinking of key executives, 
followed by the development a system aimed at meeting their information priorities. 
Moreover, to use competitor intelligence effectively in the formulation of business 
strategy, the entire organization must function as a team. Thus, raising awareness is 
critical in establishing a monitoring program. 
The first step, according to the Gilads, is to conduct an educational campaign to 
persuade information holders to contribute their knowledge to the common pool; that 
is, to make the information available to everyone through the formal intelligence 
system. In addition to education, proper incentives must be offered, since information 
is power. If one is to give it up, one must be compensated. Recognition or 
commendation by senior executives reinforces the fact that the company values an 
individual's efforts. Printed praise in company newsletters or memoranda gives the 
intelligence gatherer the incentive to contribute again in the future as well as lets 
others in the organization know how important such information is to the company. 
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Rewarding employees for their time and energies spent gathering intelligence can only 
improve the flow of information to key decision-makers. The ultimate goal is to 
incorporate competitor intelligence into a habitual strategic management approach. 
In essence, the bulk of intelligence work revolves around the analysis, not the 
theft of information. Many of the intelligence tasks are routine and far from 
dramatic, though challenging and complex, nevertheless. Although it may not involve 
sinister activities, the operational task of organizing and managing an efficient 
intelligence program requires an unusual mix of talents, not the least of which is a 
clear understanding of management's information needs and priorities. 
In designing and implementing a competitor intelligence system, however, some 
pitfalls may be encountered. John Prescott and Daniel Smith offered some guidelines 
in their article, "A Project-Based Approach to Competitive Analysis." To avoid fuzzy 
objectives, there is a need for clearly stated and articulated goals. In addition, it is 
critical to consider not only relevant competitors but also other potential competitors 
which may influence the success of the analysis as well. Often, analysts fail to obtain 
valuable information as a result of being bound to traditional methods of data 
collection. Creativity is essential in retrieving the essential items of information. At 
the same time, recognizing the diminishing returns on information is equally as 
important. Moreover, the format of final reports and analyses should consider the end 
users of the intelligence as well as provide actionable information. 
William Rothschild further elaborated on these points in the book, How to Gain 
(and Maintain) the Competitive Advantage in Business. As he indicated, it is important 
to avoid overkill by publishing voluminous reports. It is best to keep them simple and 
concise, emphasizing only that which is strategic and not get bogged down in details. 
Moreover, the intelligence must provide a forecast of future changes in the 
competitor's strategies and results. Often intelligence work reverts to a number 
39 
exercise, and the total focus is on getting the facts. This is not sufficient, and it can 
prevent the activity from becoming strategic and actionable. The organization must 
evaluate a number of competitors and be able to compare their relative strengths and 
how they impact each other. One competitor is rarely important enough to warrant 
the exclusive attention of top management. Thus, the real benefit of intelligence is to 
anticipate and make some assumptions that can be used and monitored. 
SUMMARY 
Herbert Meyer aptly noted in his book, Real-World Intelligence that today's global 
telecommunications networks move raw information around the world literally at the 
speed of light. As the capacity to move information expands, the volume of available 
information keeps growing to fill this expanding capacity. Thousands of databases are 
already in operation and with more coming online each week, a point is being reached 
where the total of human knowledge of nearly every subject or issue is available to 
anyone who wants to know it. The result, as Meyer observed, is that today's business 
executives have quite literally at their fingertips, raw information that previously would 
never have reached the organization in the first place, or would have reached it at a 
lower level. To their astonishment and growing distress, executives are discovering 
that the only thing as difficult and dangerous as managing a business with too little 
information is managing one with too much. 
To manage successfully, Meyer maintained, an executive needs a mechanism, a 
management tool, on which he or she can rely to do four things: first, sort out 
relevant from irrelevant information. Second, collect and monitor the relevant 
information as efficiently as possible. Third, process this information for the primary 
purpose of enhancing the organization's decision-making needs. Fourth, assure that the 
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results of this process, the conclusions, judgments, and projections are made available 
to key decision-makers when they need it and in a form that they can readily absorb. 
As Sumantra Ghoshal and Seok Ki Kim concluded in their article, "Building 
Effective Intelligence Systems for Competitive Advantage," above all, simply creating a 
formal intelligence system is rarely an effective means to meet the increasing 
intelligence needs of a company. To make intelligence useful, the authors contended, 
it is best to store information not in files or databases, but in the minds of the key 
decision-makers. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROCEDURES AND METHODOLOGY 
In nearly all industries, competitors can be usefully portrayed in terms of how 
intensely they compete with the organization that is motivating the analysis. There 
are usually several very direct competitors, others which compete less intensely, and 
still others that compete indirectly but are, nonetheless, relevant. The definition of 
these competitor groups will depend on a few key variables such as product/service 
lines, market segmentation, and financial performance (revenue, earnings, and growth 
poten tial). 
In Developing Business Strategies, David Aaker observed that two very different 
approaches are used to identify competitors and potential competitors. The first 
approach takes the perspective of the client who must make choices among competitors. 
The second attempts to group competitors into strategic groups on the basis of their 
competitive strategy. 
In the first approach, a list of use situations or applications are identified by 
executives from each functional area of the organization (marketing, sales, finance, and 
administration). For each use context, all the services or products that would be 
appropriate are identified and then clustered based on the similarity of their 
appropriate use contexts. The executives then simply hypothesize which products or 
services clients choose between and which ones tend to be used in certain applications. 
The concept of a strategic group provides a very different approach toward 
understanding the competitive structure of the industry. A strategic group is a group 
of firms that pursue similar competitive strategies and have similar characteristics. 
The strategic groups can be defined by the extent to which firms have developed broad 
product/service lines and clientele (multi-industry, national companies), those which 
42 
have narrow product/service lines and clientele (local, regional-based companies), and 
those with a specialized service targeted toward a specific clientele (single-industry 
specialists). 
According to Aaker, this concept of strategic groups is useful for several reasons. 
First, it is simply more manageable to analyze strategic groups than a set of individual 
and often numerous competitors. Second, the exercise of identifying the key 
distinguishing elements of strategy in an industry and then forming groups of firms 
with similar strategies provides useful insights into the competitive environment. 
Third, firms in a strategic group will be affected by and react to industry 
developments in similar ways. Thus, utilizing the strategic group approach is useful in 
projecting the future strategies of each competitor. 
In addition to identifying current competitors, it is also important to consider 
potential market entrants. The most obvious source of potential competitors is from 
market expansion. Firms operating in other geographic regions or countries may be 
seeking out more attractive opportunities as a means for increasing profitability. 
Another source of potential competitors is from product expansion. Companies will 
often exploit a common market by taking advantage of the technological and 
distribution overlap. Finally, a current small competitor with critical strategic 
weaknesses can turn into a major competitor if it is merged or acquired by a firm that 
can reduce or eliminate those weaknesses. 
Thus, the organization as a whole may have one set of competitors, while 
divisions may have their own industry-specific competitors. Hence, a combination of 
sources is used to select the targets for competitor analysis. 
General business directories, both in print and electronic form, are used in the 
initial screening process. Four sources in particular are useful for identifying current 
and potential competitors. They are: (1) Million Dollar Directory, published by Dun's 
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Marketing Services, which is a general information source for annual sales, number of 
employees, products made, officers and directors; (2) Directory of Corporate 
Affiliations, published by National Register Publishing Company, which lists publicly-
and privately-owned companies and their various subsidiaries, divisions, and 
affiliates; (3) Standard and Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives, 
published by Standard and Poor's Corporation, which lists the address, officers, and 
annual sales of over 45,000 corporations in addition to providing biographical data on 
70,000 officers and directors; and (4) Moody's Industrial Manual, published by Moody's 
Investor Service, which provides directorial, business, and, financial information on 
publicly-traded companies. Included are brief histories of companies, officers, excerpts 
of financial statements, and descriptions of stock and debt issues. 
Industry-specific directories and membership lists from professional and trade 
associations are also useful in identifying additional candidates, particularly small 
privately owned companies or third-tier subsidiaries of larger corporations. Moreover, 
research reports published by INVESTEXT, FINDjSVP, and A.D. Little can be scanned 
manually or online for tables listing the companies making up the industry. 
In addition to identifying a core group of current and potential competitors, 
another key factor in the development of a competitor intelligence system is the 
diagnosis of end users information needs. Meetings with marketing, sales, finance, and 
administrative personnel help to determine how they "view" the information and the 
relevance of the material. An understanding of the experiences, functions, and 
expectations of the individuals who will be the ultimate end users of the system is 
needed. 
Information about competitors comes from three sources: what competitors say 
about themselves, what third parties say about competitors, and what individuals within 
the organization have observed. Leonard Fuld pointed out in his book, Competitor 
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Intelligence: How to Get It: How to Use It, the most effective approach for obtaining 
competitor information is to identify for each essential element of information those 
resources considered to have the most quantitative and qualitative information. 
Exhibit III provides a listing of online sources used for locating essential elements of 
information. 
In How to Gain (and Maintain) the Competitive Advantage in Business, William 
Rothschild purported that information regarding what competitors say about themselves 
is found in three categories of sources: (1) annual reports and lOKs; (2) speeches, 
advertising, and press releases; and (3) employment advertisements. Annual reports and 
lOKs communicate how the competitor measures its own performance. These 
perceptions are invaluable as they allow the organization to compare what others say 
and believe about the competitor and the market. In particular, the financial sections 
show the growth rate of sales, the price performance in relation to inflation, as well 
as debt and liability. Still more information can be gleaned from these documents, 
namely the analysis of the business lines which provides an understanding of how the 
competitor segments its products and services. Analysts can also deduce the 
competitor's priorities and how they contribute to the sales and earnings. A 
comparison of changes in this mix may be insightful to determine if the priorities have 
changed over time. In addition, an evaluation of the board of directors and key 
executives may indicate how much control the chief executive officer has over the 
competitor company. By comparing past annual reports and lOKs, turnover and tenure 
can be highlighted and reasons for changes determined. If turnover is constant, it may 
indicate that the management team is in disarray and cannot agree on a future course 
of action. 
Advertising and speeches also enable the organization to see what the competitor 
thinks is important and the image it wishes to project. Such documents may describe 
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competitors' products and services, models and styles, or their operations. Further, 
there may also be an elaboration of the evolution and the schedule that the company 
plans to follow. Moreover, employment advertisements and personnel announcements 
provide insight into what is happening in the competitor company and the direction it 
may be pursuing. 
Information regarding what third parties say about competitors comes from a 
variety of sources, according to Rothschild. These include: (1) market research/ 
investment company reports; (2) trade press; and (3) government sources. Market 
research and investment company reports are prepared by individuals who have been 
following competitor companies and the industry for a long period of time, and thus, 
have a first-hand knowledge of their management, past successes and failures, as well 
as the major opportunities and threats confronting each competitor. In particular, 
companies such as FIND/SVP, INVESTEXT, A.D. Little, and Frost & Sullivan provide 
in-depth analyses of industries and some competitor companies. 
Rothschild also indicated that part of any company's intelligence gathering system 
should include reviewing publications covering the particular industry. These may be 
by-lined articles by competitors' executives or special features about the companies and 
their management. The articles may contain descriptions of products and services as 
well as provide pricing information. As Rothschild pointed out, articles from the trade 
press are available online from several different databases accessible through services 
such as DIALOG, BRS, NEXIS, and Pergamon/ORBIT. For example, ABI/Inform 
summarizes information on business practices, corporate strategies, and trends from 
major business and management journals. Management Contents provides business and 
management briefs from journals, books, newsletters, and reports. Other databases 
such as Magazine ASAP, Trade & Industry ASAP, and McGraw-Hill Publications offer a 
spectrum of full text publications as well as comprehensive indexing of company names, 
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people, and products. In addition, regional publications such as those covered by 
Business Dateline provide feature stories on competitors and executives that may never 
reach the national press. 
In her article, "Competitive Intelligence: The Game is Fast and Fair with Online 
Sleuthing," Sharon LaRosa observed that corporate structure is a critical piece of 
competitive information since it can reveal alliances that may strengthen a competitor's 
market position. Databases such as Corporate Affiliations and Disclosure show the 
linkages that exist between a parent company and its subsidiaries and divisions. 
Changes in company structure, which may also signal a change in strategy, can be 
monitored using such files as Standard & Poor's News, Moody's Corporate News, or 
Newswire ASAP. Moreover, changes in ownership due to a merger, leveraged buy-out, 
or stock purchase can be tracked on files such as M&A Filings, Insider Trading 
Monitor, or Disclosure/Spectrum Ownership. 
In addition, a competitor's financial health can be measured through financial 
statements, stock price data, or ratios. Disclosure's income and balance sheet data on 
over 11,000 companies can be analyzed to determine how a competitor is spending its 
resources, what its expenses are in relation to its income, or how these factors have 
changed over a five-year period. Dun's Financial Records, Investext, and Media 
General Plus are additional sources of financial statement data as well as ratios and 
industry comparisons. Analyses and projections of a competitor's earnings can be 
obtained from Investext. To monitor a competitor's stock performance, Media General 
Plus provides daily and monthly price and volume data, while DIALOG Quotes and 
Trading can be checked throughout the trading day. 
Another important aspect of competitive analysis, according to LaRosa, is 
measuring the company's products and practices against the competition. Competitors 
often change their positioning and mix of their product lines in an attempt to increase 
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their market share. New product press releases are available weekly in full text from 
PTS New Product Announcements/Plus which supplies information on the product's 
price, use, and availability as well as indicates to whom the product is directed and 
how it will be marketed. Other sources include Businesswire and PR Newswire which 
provide immediate and continuous delivery of full text news releases relating to joint 
marketing agrements, distribution channels, and other significant company events. In 
addition, McGraw-Hill News provides continuous news releases on competitors' strategic 
moves, product developments, and production and sales figures. Newswire ASAP, 
updated once a day, covers company announcements from the PR Newswire, Kyodo's 
Japan Economic Newswire, and Reuters. Moreover, the specifics of advertising 
campaigns, the agencies that developed them, and the media used are detailed in the 
PTS Marketing and Advertising Reference Service (MARS) database. Such information 
provides valuable insight regarding how a competitor is positioning its products as well 
as how it wants clients to view them. 
In addition, knowing the background of executives can also be valuable in 
understanding a competitor's business strategy. LaRosa suggested using biographical 
sources such as Marquis' Who's Who, Standard & Poor's Register-Biographical, and 
American Men and Women of Science since they provide details on the education, work 
history, and affiliations of key executives. 
Drawn from several print and online sources, DIALOG has produced the DIALOG 
Business Connection. This is a menu-driven system which provides financial 
statements, analysts' reports, executive briefs, and market share reports on thousands 
of companies. Database vendors providing this information include: Disclosure; Dun & 
Bradstreet; Media General; Moody's Investor Service; Predicasts; Standard & Poor's. 
The corporate intelligence application is used to locate company descriptions, recent 
activities, and financial data. The financial screening application provides balance 
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sheet information, income statements, and financial ratios. The products and markets 
application contains news stories on market information, product designs and processes, 
and share of market data. The sales prospecting application identifies prospective 
clients by industry, geographic area, and size. 
Government documents to be scanned for competitor information include patents 
and trademarks, competitor bids and documentation sent to the Government Contract 
Administration, and governmental agency reports. The Department of Labor, for 
instance, provides information related to the department's jurisdiction over working 
conditions, labor training, collective bargaining, and workers' compensation. The U.S. 
Geological Survey makes available from both the federal and state highway authorities, 
aerial maps of competitor facilities. The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 
releases reports on investigations of companies and products, and also complaints and 
corrective actions. In addition, several governmental agencies publish aggregate 
statitical data about industries. Among the more notable are the Department of 
Commerce publications, from census reports to economic analyses, and the Department 
of Labor compilation on employment, prices, and productivity. The Internal Revenue 
Service also publishes a sourcebook of statistics based on company tax returns. 
As David Montgomery and Charles Weinberg pointed out in their article, "Toward 
Strategic Intelligence Systems," obtaining this information is facilitated under the 
amended Freedom of Information Act which mandates that any individual has the right 
of access to and can obtain copies of any document, file, or other record in the 
possession of any federal agency or department. To limit noncompliance by delay, each 
request must be granted or denied within ten days. 
Moreover, local courthouse files on competitors' building permits and plans are 
publicly available. Details of real estate transactions and the size and volume of 
facilities are also accessible. Most of the records of state agencies arc publicly 
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available as well. These include financial and organizational information, safety and 
licensing records, and plant investigation reports. Exhibit IV provides a listing of 
government sources of competitor information. 
Credit reports can also be obtained to determine the creditworthiness of the 
competitor company. Focusing on historical financial stability and viability, they 
contain information about how the competitor views itself as well as provide comments 
and quotations by officers and suppliers. Additionally, they also include biographical 
data on key executives and their families. 
In Competitor Intelligence: How to Get It; How to Use It, Leonard Fuld 
suggested that information about competitors can also be obtained from non-published 
sources such as trade shows and conventions, office/plant tours, professional 
associations and advocacy groups. Trade shows give competitors the opportunity to 
display their newest products, marketing techniques, and advertising programs. In 
addition, representatives often provide detailed information about their products as well 
as even hint of things to come in the hope of generating potential client interest. 
Office and plant tours also provide valuable information about a competitor's products 
and services, processes, and equipment. Professional associations' publications, 
conferences, and seminars often focus on member companies and the industry as a 
whole. Intelligence can be obtained regarding such areas as market shares, sales, 
expenditures, business units, and employee practices. Moreover, advocacy groups 
including labor unions, minority-rights groups, environmental and consumer protection 
organizations, and civil liberties unions will often track and monitor companies at the 
local, state, and federal levels regarding employment practices, working conditions, and 
business practices. Their research findings provide added insight into a competitor's 
management style and corporate culture. 
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Local chambers of commerce can often give information on employment, the size 
of the competitors' offices and facilities, and the products or services being offered at 
a particular location. Local newsletters or newspapers contain intelligence on 
employment, organization, expansions and developments as well as an overall assessment 
of the economic and social climate. Selected field sources of competitor information 
are listed in Exhibit V. 
Tamar and Benjaimin Gilad indicated in their book, The Business Intelligence 
System, that information regarding what the organization has observed about 
competitors is obtained through a firmwide "intelligence audit." This audit includes 
telephone and in-person interviews of key personnel in order to identify potential 
pockets of competitor information and potential company collectors. A sample audit 
interview guide is provided in Exhibit VI. 
In addition to the audit interview, scanning company databases and files also 
identifies the existing as well as potential competitor information base. The company 
may have many databases that have been established over the years. Though each may 
be structured differently, accessed through different software programs, or stored on 
different computer systems, a list of these databases is made as part of the 
intelligence audit. Once the databases are known and evaluated for their usefulness 
of their content of intelligence, methods can then be established to access the 
information they contain. 
According to the Gilads, to effectively make use of the valuable data available 
from former employees of competitor companies, the human resources department of 
the organization should report regularly about new employees hired and forward their 
resumes to the intelligence unit for review. The intelligence staff then determines if 
the background is relevant to the organization's intelligence targets. If it is, the 
intelligence unit holds a debriefing session. This debriefing is conducted by the head 
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of the department of the new employee and with a representative of the intelligence 
staff. The interview is conducted with the consent of the employee and with the 
assurance that no information considered to be proprietary would be asked for or 
divulged. 
SUMMARY 
Putting an accurate picture of the competitive situation requires that information 
be gleaned from many sources. It is true that although the bulk of information comes 
from published sources, from trade publications to online databases, field sources of 
information provide the most recent, specific, directly relevant, and less widely known 
intelligence. Therefore, the goal of an effective intelligence system is to tap as many 
field sources as possible. 
Once created and implemented, a competitor intelligence system can be used to 
assist management not only in monitoring the organization's strategic plan but also in 
executing the strategy. More importantly, by analyzing competitors, management will 
gain a better understanding of their own organization and be able to rectify 
accordingly any apparent deficiencies in operations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The actual composition of internal intelligence systems varies from company to 
company, depending upon the industries it which they do business, how they are 
structured, their size, and the availability of particular employees to function as 
analysts and collectors. Nevertheless, when intelligence audit results are analyzed, 
nearly all companies find that each of their functional areas have some useful 
in telligence data. 
There are alternative ways for organizing the collection and analysis activities. 
Whether they are to be centralized, decentralized, or distributed is dependent upon the 
general structure of the intelligence system. The collection and analysis function may 
be part of the corporate intelligence unit, where analysis is performed by staff 
analysts. Conversely, colection and analysis may be performed within each business 
unit. The functions may also be divided between the corporate unit and the local 
business unit, with each allocated different parts of the analysis. Even within these 
three structures, variations also exist. 
The internal analysis network is composed of experts within the organization who 
interpret intelligence and give advice on matters relating to the competitors' 
operations, markets, the industry and technologies. They may be experts on particular 
topics, markets, technologies, or product areas. The internal collection network, on 
the other hand, consists of employees who serve as collectors of intelligence, especially 
field data. 
Members of the internal collection network, unlike the analysis network, collect 
data of interest to the organization, identify and access sources of information, 
participate in ad hoc or special intelligence projects, and report intelligence findings. 
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In addition to gathering field data, these collectors may also monitor certain 
publications, abstract or clip pertinent items, and forward them to the intelligence unit. 
The internal collection network, moreover, enables the intelligence system to 
access diverse sources of data. Due to the fact that there are so many potential 
sources of intelligence, analysts do not have time to gather information from all of 
them. The collection network is necessary to cover all possible sources, particularly 
field data passed on during whatever business transaction is taking place. Thus, the 
collection network allows the system to generate more data as well. 
In addition, the collection network screens data by experts in the organization to 
determine the appropriateness of immediate distribution of critical intelligence. 
Screening of incoming information by designated individuals increases the usefulness of 
the data by enabling the users to respond to events as they occur. 
The building of a collection network requires two elements at the outset: an 
understanding of the type of information that is needed, and knowledge of the 
information to which people in the organization have access. Accordingly, committees 
such as the intelligence committee, an analysis committee, and a users committee can 
all be used for implementing the collection network. 
The intelligence committee, composed of representatives from each of the 
organization's business units oversees the implementation and development of 
intelligence activities. The committee can be structured either as a standing committee 
or as a temporary team. Its agenda is determined by the intelligence unit with input 
from the committee participants. In addition, the committee helps tailor the collection 
network to the method of operation of each group or department. 
The main purpose of the users committee is to get users of intelligence actively 
involved in the process. In addition, it is a way to solicit the demand for intelligence. 
Moreover, the committee can serve as a forum where decision-makers can share ideas 
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about the use of intelligence and the intelligence unit can promote the use of its 
products. 
The analysis committee is composed of managers from various functional and 
product/service groups in the organization. Members work together, either as a 
permanent committee or in a role-playing, ad hoc committee, to provide composite 
competitor profiles. These profiles are then used to assess the competitive standing of 
the company. In the analysis committee structure, the business unit serves as the 
coordinating body for the committee. As part of this responsibility, it prepares the 
input to the meetings. Any available data that could be of use to the committee in 
their analyses are collated, condensed, and prepared by the intelligence unit. The unit 
also maintains the administrative details of the meeting and is responsible for the 
compilation of the final analyses that emerge from the sessions, including the 
distribution of the results. 
From an organizational point of view, there are three ways of structuring the 
data-reporting network: (l) centralized distribution; (2) decentralized distribution; and 
(3) functional distribution. In centralized distribution, every piece of intelligence 
collected by the network is sent to the competitor intelligence unit, and in the absence 
of a separate unit, to the intelligence specialist in a designated department. Someone 
within the unit then decides whether the data should be put in a file for future use in 
preparing analyses and reports, or whether it should be immediately distributed to the 
appropriate users. In a decentralized system, each collector is responsible for the 
distribution of his or her own data to the unit and to the end-users. Moreover, in the 
functional system, one person within each department or functional area is made 
responsible for the distribution of all material that is generated by the area. That 
person is also charged with the task of determining whether or not an item is 
information that should be sent to the intelligence unit only, or whether it !<; 
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intelligence that needs action from some other department or executive within the 
organization. 
The format for communicating the intelligence varies from company to company as 
well. Specially designed intelligence reports are common, though other methods such 
as telephone calls, voice messages, electronic mail, and direct computer access are also 
used. Written intelligence reports typically consist of several sections, including one 
for data, a description of the circumstances of collection, comments, and an evaluation 
score for the source. Telephone calls to the intelligence unit require that someone 
from the unit record the calls and write down the intelligence on a form. Voice 
messages also require that the intelligence be transcribed for filing and dissemination. 
Electronic mail permits messages to be entered and delivered to a list of addresses. If 
a company maintains a mainframe-based online database of competitor intelligence, then 
information can be directly inputed into the database through terminals throughout the 
organiza tion. 
Educating collectors of intelligence is accomplished through the intelligence 
briefing. These briefings serve as a forum for conveying information regarding the 
establishment and ongoing management of the intelligence system. In addition, they 
are a means for identifying the intelligence targets and the information that the unit 
is seeking. The possible sources of information to which the group has access are also 
discussed. Procedures for reporting intelligence data are outlined as well. Moreover, 
employees are informed of the legal and ethical considerations of gathering intelligence 
along with need for counterintelligence measures. These briefings can be scheduled as 
separate meetings for each functional area or department or be given as part of the 
company's annual meeting. Briefings may be as short as two hours or as long as a 
half-day, depending upon the extent of the training. Exhibit VII is an example of a 
suggested agenda. 
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Depending upon the scope, breadth, and funding of the monitoring program, 
storing and retrieving competitor information may be accomplished through the use of 
a manual filing system, a totally computerized system, or a combination of the two. 
There are four basic requirements for the storage system. First, the system must 
permit the storage and retrieving of textual information. This may include descriptions 
of the competitors' product lines, a list of offices and locations, as as well as data 
about management, their background, the organizational structure of the competitor 
company, and its strategic plans. Second, the system must permit the storage and 
manipulation of large amounts of data. Third, the system must facilitate the storage 
and retrieval of data by multiple keys so that bits of data can be related to each 
other. Most of the information about competitors and the environment appears as bits 
and pieces and comes from many different sources. To compile a meaningful 
intelligence portrait of the competition, all the fragments must be categorized, collated, 
and related to each other. Many of the developments in the competitive environment 
cannot be understood outside of the context of the stream of events that led to their 
occurrence. Thus, in order to understand the full implication, information has to be 
related to what has preceded it or to other events that influence the interpretation. 
Fourth, the system must provide information on a timely basis. Much of the 
intelligence information has time value and and therefore requires prompt action. 
Action may vary from a request for additional data to clarify a situation to the 
generation of an in-depth intelligence report. 
A competitor intelligence system can be categorized by the type of information 
stored, and by implication, by how the system is used in the analysis process. System 
types are defined one of four ways: (1) the storage and retrieval of raw data; (2) the 
storage and retrieval of abstracts of raw data; (3) the storage and retrieval of 
processed data; and (4) the storage and retrieval of intelligence reports and competitor 
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profiles. Systems one and two are very similar. Under system one, raw data are 
stored as is. In system two, the raw data undergo some initial processing in the form 
of abstracting. In either case, what is available is only raw data. This is in contrast 
to system four, where what is stored and available to users is the final intelligence. 
System three is similar to system four, in that the information is already processed but 
only includes detailed summaries. The information is not integrated into a 
comprehensive intelligence report, as it would be in system four, nor does it consist of 
many discrete, unrelated pieces of data, as in the other two systems. 
Raw data may consist of field information, published information, or both. 
Whatever the source of the information, for each element of data, the following is 
stored: (1) complete source reference; (2) content; (3) reliability of source; 
(4) validity of source; and (5) security/access restrictions. The storage and retrieval of 
abstracts of raw data provide detailed information on the content of a document, and 
in some cases, substitutes for the document in meeting information needs. The essence 
of the document is extracted in a few key sentences and includes any relevant terms, 
company names, people, or processes. Rather than storing every piece of data as it is 
captured, processed data, on the other hand, is periodically integrated into already 
existing information. Information about competitors is categorized and included within 
each category is a summary of relevant data together with an assessment of the 
information and its implications. A system which is designed to store and retrieve 
intelligence reports and competitor profiles, in effect, serves as a vehicle for the 
dissemination of intelligence and nothing more. 
Competitor intelligence products vary widely from company to company. Despite 
their diversity, four generic categories of competitor intelligence have been identified: 
(1) net estimates of competitor strategies; (2) periodic reports on competitive activities 
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and trends; (3) base case intelligence research on competitors; and (4) spot intelligence 
items of interest. 
Spot intelligence is a request from management about a narrow topic of interest 
or which answers a specific question. Base case intelligence is the exhaustive, never-
completed competitor intelligence case study. It covers all aspects of a competitor's 
organization, its business units, and the full range of identified strengths, weaknesses, 
and capabilities. This is the research core of intelligence and is best viewed as the 
working intelligence file on a competitor that details the past, outlines the present, 
and projects the future. Periodic intelligence, on the other hand, serves as a 
monitoring and reporting function. Produced on a quarterly or semi-annual basis, the 
periodic format provides a quick, summarized update on current competitor activity. 
Strategic net estimates are a final totalling up of a competitor's strengths and 
weaknesses, competitive performance, strategic goals, and most probable courses of 
action and reaction. Exhibits VIII-XII provide an overview of the categories of 
competitor intelligence as well as furnish supporting details. 
Although other methods of dissemination may be used, the printed report 
continues to be the mainstay for the competitor intelligence system. An electronic 
mail system permits messages to be entered and delivered to a list of addressees. In 
addition, a set of user interest profiles comprised of keywords describing the specific 
interests of the system's users can be maintained on the system as well. Thus, any 
new message entering the system that matches the keyword established by the user will 
automatically be put on that user's mail queue. For those companies that have 
established a computerized intelligence database, written intelligence reports can be 
accessed directly along with the raw data. Logon messages are programmed into the 
computer so when the user logs on, a message indicates the latest available reports. 
Thus, to design the best dissemination system possible, the organization must consider 
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who should receive the intelligence and what vehicles are appropriate to meet the 
users' needs. 
Moreover, different people absorb intelligence in different ways. Some people like 
to read while others liked to be talked to face-to-face. Others prefer listening to 
audiotapes. Some like charts and other assorted visuals, including videotapes. It is 
the intelligence unit's responsibility to determine what will work best for the decision-
makers they serve, and to orient themselves to whatever turns out to be the most 
appropriate medium. Thus, the unit must be prepared to deliver its products in the 
form of reports, or audiotapes, videotapes, charts, briefings, or any combination of 
these. 
Operational intelligence typically has a short horizon and requires immediate 
consideration. It usually contains information about developments that management 
may want to counter immediately. Such intelligence will, therefore, be reported on a 
daily basis or as the information becomes available. Examples of operational 
intelligence include competitor price changes, sales promotions, market analyses, and 
significant announcements by competitors to enter a new market or acquire another 
company. 
On the other hand, strategic intelligence will, in general, be reported on a 
monthly, quarterly, and annual basis. Such intelligence supports longer-term decisions 
and as such consists of the compilation of comprehensive information that has been 
accumulated over a period of time. Strategic intelligence may include a monthly 
compilation of key statistics, a quarterly analysis of market trends, or in-depth 
competitor profiles. 
In essence, every major business decision requires intelligence input to some 
extent. While each situation may call for unique information input, there are, 
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nevertheless, some common information building blocks underlying specific competitive 
decisions. 
The intelligence input required for decisions regarding new products, for example, 
is in many ways similar to that required for entry into a new business, since both 
decisions deal with the uncertainty of competitors' response and the barriers to 
intrusion into a new or existing market. The cost of entering requires knowledge of 
the economics of the industry. If the incumbents have created barriers to entry, the 
cost of entry will be high. Moreover, the barriers to entry can take many forms: 
economies of scale in sales and service; established brand names; distribution channels 
tied up by incumbents; proprietary technology protecting incumbents. Thus, to 
understand the possible response of incumbents to a new entrant, intelligence is 
gathered on the incumbents' management, their motivation to fight newcomers, their 
history of fighting entry, as well as their range of offensive moves. 
The type of intelligence required by the mergers and acquisition function is not 
much different than that required for industry and competitor analyses. Analysts are 
performing both analyses in the process of identifying an attractive industry, and a 
potential candidate within the industry. For example, if a company were looking to 
increase market share, its scanning would be in the same industry. Diversification, on 
the other hand, requires scanning for industries and companies with cash-flow patterns 
different from the firm's own pattern. Speculative acquisitions calls for scanning 
mismanaged companies and companies in trouble. In short, the merger or acquisition 
policy's objectives will determine to a great extent the nature of the intelligence 
sought. 
Competitive analysis that culminates in the establishment of profiles provides 
information about the competitors' strengths and weaknesses, their likely future 
strategies, and an estimate of the competitors' responses to the company's own change 
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in strategy. An analysis of the competitors' strengths and weaknesses requires the 
dissecting of operations and then examining each component separately for competitive 
advantages and disadvantages. The list analysts use to size up the real capabilities of 
the competitor depends upon the purpose of the analysis. If the analysis is a 
comprehensive report on the competition, then one analyzes all of the competitor's 
operational areas. However, if the assessment of the competitor is done as part of a 
proposal for a particular strategic move, analysts use a specific list of factors or 
functional areas that are important to that move, and estimate the competitor's 
capabilities according to the tailored list. 
In addition to compiling competitor profiles, shadow marketing is also a technique 
used in competitor analysis. As Carolyn Vella and John McGonagle, Jr. explained in 
their article, "Shadowing Markets: A New Competitive Intelligence Technique," it owes 
its name to the British political concept of the "shadow cabinet" which is formed by 
the party out of power in Parliament. Each member of the shadow cabinet is assigned 
a British government department to follow. In corporations, shadowing markets means 
preparing a document that comes as close to the competitor's market plan as 
competitive intelligence can make it. The scope of this endeavor typically includes: 
(1) monitoring personnel changes affecting any operation of particular interest; 
(2) reviewing press releases and speeches as well as stories in the trade press; 
(3) attending trade shows to meet with competitor personnel and contractors, such as 
advertising agencies or consulting firms; (4) reading corporate documents ranging from 
new technical product brochures to competitor newsletters; (5) following technological 
developments by tracking papers and articles by key personnel; (6) learning about the 
background and employment records of key executives; (7) tracking regulatory jlegal 
matters in which the competitor may be involved; and (8) studying the competitor's 
track record and prior history to understand where its personnel came from, their 
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perspectives, and their experience. Once enough data has been obtained, competitive 
scenarios are written. 
In its purest form, individuals engaged in shadow market planning essentially 
"become" the competitor being monitored. Those involved in the process think and 
react just the way the competitor does. Ultimately, by identifying with the 
competitor, shadow market planners are able to develop analyses of what the target 
will be doing over time and under various conditions. 
Benchmarking is another analytical tool for measuring an organization's operations 
against the best-in-class companies inside and outside of its markets. The process of 
benchmarking, according to Timothy Furey in his article, "Benchmarking: The Key to 
Developing Competitive Advantage in Mature Markets," includes seven steps: (1) 
determining which functional areas within the organization will benefit most from 
benchmarking; (2) identifying the key factors and variables with which to measure 
competitive cost and quality for those functions; (3) selecting the best-in-class 
competitors for each item to be benchmarked; (4) measuring the organization's own 
performance for each benchmark item; (5) measuring the performance of the best-in-
class performance for each item and determining the gap between the organization and 
the best-in-class; (6) specifying programs and actions to close the gap; and 
(7) implementing these programs by setting specific improvement targets and deadlines 
and by developing a monitoring process to review and update targets over time. 
Moreover, benchmarking analysis covers one or all of the following broad 
categories: (1) cost - direct and indirect; (2) product or service quality and features; 
(3) consumer satisfaction levels; (4) organizational efficiency and effectiveness; and 
(5) corporate culture. Data for benchmarking analysis is gathered from three different 
types of sources: first, a wide range of published sources, including competitor 
generated information, articles in the national and trade press, analysts' reports, and 
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government documents. Second, in-depth interviews with third parties such as clients, 
vendors, and service agencies of the best-in-class companies. Third, analyses of one's 
own company operations. 
In charting a competitor's current strategy, analysts look for signs that a major 
shift in strategy is about to take place. A competitor replacing its top officers may 
be headed for a new strategic direction, especially if the new executives in charge are 
not picked and nutured by the previous management. In addition, a competitor that is 
building strength by adding resources may be signaling a change in strategy. 
Moreover, a competitor changing its advertising agency, consulting firm, or suppliers 
may, at the same time, be changing its strategic direction as well. By collecting 
intelligence, it is possible to infer the assumptions, beliefs, and reactions of the 
competitor's management team. Beliefs, together with goals and priorities shape a 
competitor's actions. What the competition believes about itself, its rivals, and the 
industry determine what it thinks it can and should do. Thus, if pieced together, 
intelligence can paint a relatively accurate picture of what drives the competition, and 
where it is driven to go. 
SUMMARY 
No two competitor intelligence systems are the same just as no two companies are 
alike. Nevertheless, the process of intelligence does not vary. In all systems, this 
process is composed of four basic steps: first, selecting what needs to be known. 
Second, collecting the information. Third, transforming the collected information into 
finished products. Fourth, distributing these products to key decision-makers. 
These are the steps required to produce intelligence no matter what the business 
or the issue at hand. What these steps add up to is useful, actionable information that 
a company can use to create and implement a successful competitive strategy. 
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Ultimately, the fundamental purpose of analyzing competitors is to understand one's 
own organization better. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
If the emergence of seminars, a professional association, and numerous books and 
articles are any indication of the importance of a new organizational activity, then 
competitive intelligence has clearly come of age. The value of competitive intelligence 
is being recognized by everyone from presidents of corporations to traveling sales 
managers. At the same time, however, myths about the collection and use of 
intelligence still prevail. First, there is the myth that competitive analysis is only 
necessary in highly competitive environments. Lulled into a false sense of security, 
companies often neglect to monitor competitive threats outside the industry. This is 
particularly dangerous since threats from indirect sources of competition may prove to 
be more disasterous than those of direct competitors. In short, there is no such thing 
as a static environment. There are only environments in which competitors and their 
activities are more or less visible. 
A second myth is that competitive intelligence must be comprehensive and uniform 
from one competitor to the next. This single-minded perspective results in generalized 
information that masks the idiosyncrasies that often lie at the heart of a particular 
competitor's strengths and weaknesses. Ultimately, the success of a company's 
strategic plan may hinge on exploiting the unique vulnerabilities of specific 
competitors. 
The "more is better" assumption perpetuates the popular belief that the degree of 
uncertainty in decision-making declines as intelligence accumulates. Thus, executives 
are often overwhelmed with information that is completely irrelevant or at best 
tangential. The net result is information overload, a condition that masks any 
competitive advantage because it is buried somewhere in all of that data. Hence, faced 
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with large quantities of information that may be irrelevant to the task at hand or 
unrelated to the business decisions they are to make, many executives dismiss the 
entire competitor intelligence effort as wasteful and useless. 
Equally as harmful are those executives who make decisions based upon whatever 
information is available at the moment. These executives have adapted to information-
poor environments, where decisions are made without the proper intelligence 
background. Unfortunately, this too, leads to decisions that are made based upon 
invalid assumptions or superficial intelligence. If users receive a flood of information in 
the form of newspaper clippings, statistics, field reports, articles, and so forth, the 
system is not providing them with useful intelligence. 
The purpose of the intelligence system is to supply users with intelligence, and to 
this end, the analyst's role is to serve as an intermediary between collectors and 
decision-makers by converting voluminous raw data into meaningful, useful intelligence. 
Dissemination of raw data should be limited to what users perceive as necessary 
background information and to what they will have time to read. Users should receive 
only those intelligence reports that contain information inportant to them as decision-
makers. Thus, the information should be in a format that will free them to use it 
directly and without assembling and analyzing data. 
The single most challenging problem for the intelligence unit is to obtain and 
maintain the active involvement of the various functional departments and line 
managers in the acquisition and communication of intelligence. However, an 
intelligence system that boasts an extensive product of no interests to users, is a 
system which is ultimately a waste of resources. Therefore, it is critical when 
creating a system that an analysis be made of user needs and requirements and a 
dissemination and reporting procedure be set up and geared to user specifications. 
This can be accomplished through the intelligence audit initially, and on an ongoing 
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basis through the users committee, which ensures that reports and briefings are user-
driven. 
Undeniably, it is a difficult task to clearly formulate one's information 
requirements. It is easier to make decisions based upon whatever is available at the 
moment, without articulating information needs or investing a great deal of effort in 
collecting and analyzing the appropriate data. Moreover, many managers prefer to do 
their own intelligence gathering and rely on their own informal networks rather than 
participate in a company-wide intelligence effort. In the long run, however, it is far 
more costly to both the individual and the organization. 
Regarding the cost of intelligence, there is a common misperception that a linear 
relationship exists between the availability of competitive intelligence and a company's 
expenditures on intelligence related activities. Some intelligence costs nothing to 
obtain and is often an unintended by-product of other activities. Clearly, intelligence 
obtained by a salesperson in the field is a by-product of the selling activity, for 
instance. Other intelligence pieces may cost very little, such as a competitor's 
brochure or product. However, some intelligence, such as a competitor's strategic plans 
cannot be legally obtained at any price, and company management, moreover, should 
not expect to obtain such intelligence. Thus, an effective intelligence system should 
provide management with enough input to make informed decisions at a cost not 
exceeding the value of the intelligence. 
Perhaps the most common and in many ways the most dangerous misperception 
regarding competitive intelligence is that a formal intelligence "system is needed, and 
can only be undertaken, by large corporations. This is simply not true. Small and 
medium-sized companies, including divisions of larger corporations, need to know about 
the competition and other environmental factors just as much, if not more than, large 
corporations. The resources that may be available to invest in a formal system may be 
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limited, but that does not mean, however, that intelligence activities should not be 
undertaken. An effective system can be based on simple measures such as allocating 
existing staff on a part-time basis, formalizing some of the procedures discussed, and 
most importantly, raising every employee's awareness to the company's intelligence 
needs. 
IMPLICA TION 
In this discussion, an independent competitor intelligence unit, whether on the 
corporate level or within a business unit, has been assumed. However, not all 
intelligence units are independent, and whether they are separate or part of another 
department, whether they reside within a particular functional area or report directly 
to the chief executive officer, varies widely from company to company. To a certain 
extent, the diversity of these organizational structures can be traced to the fact that 
the activities tend to concentrate in certain functional areas more than in others. A 
formal intelligence function cannot be created in a vacuum. The result is that 
different companies design their newly organized intelligence effort around different 
existing intelligence centers. Economic departments conduct some type of 
environmental monitoring and analysis, marketing engages in pricing and product 
positioning, and the library engages in database searching for the entire corporation. 
Each of these areas may serve as the core around which to build a competitor 
intelligence system. 
Frequently, the system develops where there is someone to fight for it. Unless 
there is a conscious effort by senior management to examine the various alternatives 
for structuring the intelligence function and to set it up in a manner most appropriate 
for its needs, the implementation of the intelligence system will be an evolutionary 
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process at best. At its worst, the function may end up anywhere in the organization, 
not necessarily where it can be most effective. 
However, the fact that informal intelligence activities and some formal 
environmental scanning processes are carried out in nearly every organization suggests 
that in organizing a system, companies should rely as much as possible on existing 
centers and channels of intelligence activities. Moreover, careful restructuring can 
bring together under one area various groups that have previously functioned separately 
and have reported to diverse departments. These can serve as the foundation for a 
new, independent intelligence unit. Thus, traditional functions such as economic and 
country risk analysis, market research, and industry analysis can form the core of the 
new intelligence unit. More importantly, the advantage of using existing groups and 
organizational entities is that it can facilitate the acceptance of change by the 
organizational bureaucracy. 
Even though a formalized competitor intelligence system may require automation 
and computers, the inputs to the system, can and must, be highly personalized. The 
personalized nature of the inputs, therefore, requires that the system involve, in 
addition to automated processing equipment, the right people at the right place to 
obtain information. 
A competitor intelligence system will either succeed or fail on the effectiveness 
of its internal intelligence networks. For it to succeed, everyone must be enlisted in 
the intelligence process. Collectors should participate in the collection network and 
decision-makers should learn to use the system and its intelligence output to support 
their decisions. Participation of everyone in the organization requires that a positive 
companywide attitude be adopted. One way of doing this is to introduce change first 
in one division and demonstrate the success of the system there, before trying to sell 
the rest of the organization on the idea of intelligence. This should be a division that 
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either has already in place some of the components of intelligence that can be 
successfully incorporated into an intelligence system or a division that has a great 
need for intelligence but currently does not have it, so any improvement will 
demonstrate the value of intelligence. 
Support by top management, however, is the single most important factor behind 
the success or failure of an intelligence system. If such support cannot be mustered, 
or if it falters after the system is implemented, then the company will not be able to 
maintain a successful firmwide intelligence system. Sometimes, the intelligence system 
is the brainchild of a single senior executive who nutures it, but then leaves the 
company, after which the system deteriorates. Thus, it is imperative that commitment 
to the intelligence system go beyond the enthusiasm of a lone champion. One method 
of involving more executives in the intelligence function is to gain their participation 
in the various committees. Another is to tailor intelligence reports to top management 
interests and projects. Knowledge provides sound commitment on which to build the 
intelligence effort. 
Through the creation and implementation of a competitor intelligence system, 
intelligence analysts can help managers to see more clearly the analytical link between 
the comparative performance of business opportunities and their competitive strategy. 
In turn, managers can focus the intelligence program on the most critical 
microeconomic factors in the business, while at the same time, improve the collection 
of competitor data by identifying the most useful, reliable information sources. By 
targeting the collection and analysis effort on the most relevant measures of 
competitive strategy, the use of limited intelligence resources can be facilitated. Over 
the long run, the development of this critical intelligence partnership between the 
intelligence staff and management will foster the growth of a program that effectively 
covers the full positional and performance spectrum of a competitor's strategy. More 
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importantly, this partnership will tie the corporate level strategic intelligence effort 
into the operational concerns and information sources of the company's information 
center. 
A successful monitoring program requires constancy, longevity, and involvement. 
Competitors must be studied constantly in order not to miss the early warning that is 
critical for effective action. Otherwise, the company loses the chance to gain the 
market edge. Moreover, it takes time to generate a companywide commitment to 
monitoring, to develop contacts, and to establish manageable information storage and 
retrieval systems. To be truly effective, it may take three to five years. In that 
time, the trust of executives and departments must be won, networks must be 
established for gathering and evaluating intelligence as well as for training staff 
members in the various skills needed to collect information productively and efficiently. 
Most importantly, competitor monitoring must be a corporate effort. All employees 
must be encouraged to contribute information regularly. One person or group alone 
cannot possibly monitor competitors as effectively as the entire organization can. 
For those corporations that have adopted an organized competitive intelligence 
function, the days of debating whether such activities should be carried out informally 
or formally are over. The main reason to formalize the function is, without exception, 
to combat the onslaught of competition and rivalry in maturing markets. Informal 
monitoring of competitive developments is no longer sufficient to ensure the timely 
warning of competitors' moves or the opening of new opportunities. 
Dealing with competitors, however, does not always mean destroying them. To 
operate effectively over time, most industries require a group of good competitors. 
Having proper competitors allows a firm to earn more profits, develop new markets, 
and create better entry barriers than it could alone. For a firm to cope strategically 
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with its competitive forces, however, management must identify when to compete, when 
to cooperate, and how to do so effectively. 
Competitive advantage is achieved if the firm alters the balance among the forces 
or creates an opportunity where there was none before. To this end, the ultimate 
objective of competitor analysis is to clearly understand the balance of power among 
these competitive forces so that changes are introduced where they will have the 
greatest impact. 
While a company may have difficulty maintaining an individual advantage, it can 
transform a series of innovations into a valuable image. This image can help maintain 
a market position, especially in periods when a line of products or services is not 
successfully competitive. Thus, the harder the service or product is to emulate, the 
higher the barrier for the competition. 
No matter what a company does, however, it cannot escape the changing 
environment in today's marketplace. Often, the uncertainties brought about by change 
affect the efficiency of a company's operations. Recognizing this, many companies are 
utilizing information which allows them to anticipate the changes occurring in their 
markets or industries. True, a company cannot escape change but executives can 
manage it, understand it, and even use it to the company's advantage with decisions 
based on quality information. 
Information can ultimately alter the industry structure. It can create bridges 
between buyers and suppliers, barriers to rivals, and obstacles to new entrants. It also 
affords an inexpensive way to gain an immediate edge on the competition. Companies 
can differentiate themselves from the rest of the market, create new business 
opportunities, and sort out ideas that will work from those that will not. 
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The key to competitor analysis is the ability to go beyond the facts and figures 
and anticipate how competitors think. Facts reveal what competitors have done in the 
past. What management needs to know, however, is how competitors are going to 
respond in the future. The overall objective of the competitor intelligence program is 
to gather today's information in order to anticipate what competitors will do 
tommorrow. 
RECOMMENDA TIONS 
A competitive intelligence system must be tailored to each company's culture. 
The system's organization will depend largely upon whether the corporation as a whole 
is centralized or decentralized and whether or not it is to support key executives, 
operational managers or both. In addition, size and cost will have a major effect on 
the kind of intelligence system a company puts into place. There is a critical mass 
required. An effective system cannot be developed and maintained unless there is an 
adequate level of funding and staff to sustain its operation. 
Nevertheless, it is not always possible to create an optimum competitive 
intelligence system. Due to the expense or uncertainty of its value, some corporations 
will not fund the development of a complete intelligence system from the outset. 
Competitive intelligence is not an all or nothing proposition, however. 
An alternative approach to a comprehensive, ongoing competitor intelligence 
system is one which is tailored to meet the unique information requirements of a 
specific project. As John Prescott and Daniel Smith indicated in their article, "A 
Project-Based Approach to Competitive Analysis," a project-based competitive analysis 
system is distinctly different from a comprehensive, ongoing system on several 
dimensions. First, a project-based approach is more focused, driven by the specific 
information objectives of the project and is, therefore, more manageable. Second, the 
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number and types of competitors typically differ from project to project. Thus, 
relative competitive strengths and weaknesses, while commonly analyzed at the 
corporate or business unit levels, are actually unique to specific projects and are more 
readily evaluated at this level. Third, efficiency is enhanced to the extent that data 
collection is directed by the specific information requirements of a particular project, 
thus resulting in a lower cost-per-unit of useful information. Fourth, the results can 
be immediately integrated into strategy formulation and implementation. Lastly, a 
project-based approach may facilitate the acceptance and development ofa more 
comprehensive, ongoing competitor intelligence system. The highly relevant information 
gained from a project-based analysis will hopefully sensitize key executives to the 
usefulness of systematically generated intelligence as an input to their decision-making. 
Establishing a competitive intelligence system should be an offensive action, an 
initiative that should provide a company with a competitive advantage, not a reaction 
to what the competition is doing. The total cost with respect to time, money, and 
staff should be viewed as an investment into the company's future and survival. A 
major problem to overcome is the general lack of knowledge about intelligence and its 
uses. Additional time and effort are required to educate senior management on how 
and when to use intelligence. For the intelligence system to be effective, management 
must be committed not only to the system's development but also to its use as a way 
to outperform the competition. 
As can be seen, a well-stocked, well-staffed corporate library is vital for a 
successful monitoring program. Moreover, the library is the ideal place to store 
competitive information because it is often centrally located and staffed by 
professionals who are experts at organizing and retrieving information. Information 
professionals make information gathering their full time responsibility. They are taught 
how to catalog and to organize disparate types of documents such as those used in 
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competitor analysis and monitoring. Due to their knowledge of printed and electronic 
sources, information specialists can select and package the competitor intelligence 
requested, publish articles summaries or newsletters, and create a master archive for 
competitor profiles, studies, and reports. 
Sara Galligan, in her article, "The Information Resources Specialist as Group 
Facilitator in an Organizational Setting," aptly pointed out that participation by 
information professionals in the organization's decision-making process has benefits for 
the library as well as for the organization. The exposure and visibility of information 
professionals offer the chance to market library services, learn more about the 
organization, and propose the use of information sources in response to needs that 
arise during meetings and briefings. Moreover, the information professionals' direct 
contact with a broad range of organizational problems has ramifications for material 
selection, the promotion and use of automated and manual services in addition to how 
well the library staff is able to respond to particular information requests. Above all, 
information professionals gain direct access to the organization's concerns, while at the 
same time, have the opportunity to introduce both the skills and resources of the 
library to the company. 
The ultimate goal of this project was to show that as far as competitor 
monitoring and analysis are concerned, information professionals can and should playa 
critical role in the overall success and effectiveness of a competitor intelligence 
program. As an intelligence analyst, the information professional can become a part of 
the business team, and at the same time, foster a growing appreciation of the role of 
information in the organization's strategic planning process. 
In a competitive world, the strongest weapon is information. Information helps 
executives make more effective decisions and to channel resources into critical areas of 
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business operations. Thus, information needs to be communicated to them in the right 
format, at the right time, and with the appropriate degree of urgency. By organizing a 
competitor intelligence and analysis program, management will ultimately be organizing 
for survival. 
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EXHIBIT I 
Sources of Competitor Information 
What Competitors Say about Themselves 
Public 
Advertising 
Promotional Materials 
Press Releases 
Speeches 
Books 
Articles 
Personnel Changes 
Want Ads 
Trade IProf essional 
Manuals 
Technical Papers 
Licenses 
Patents 
Courses 
Seminars 
Government 
Security & Exchange 
Commission Reports 
Federal Information Centers 
Testimony 
Antitrust 
Investment 
Annual Meetings 
Ann ual Reports 
Stock/Bond Issues 
What Others Say about Them 
Public 
Books 
Articles 
Case Studies 
Consultants 
Newspaper Reporters 
Environmental Groups 
Consumer Groups 
Unions 
Executive Search/Recruiting Firms 
Trade/Prof essional 
Suppliers/Vendors 
Trade Press 
Industry Studies 
Clients 
Subcontractors 
Government 
Lawsuits 
Antitrust 
Local/State/Federal Agencies 
National Plans 
Government Programs 
Investment 
Security Analyst Reports 
Industry Studies 
Credit Reports 
I. Background/History 
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EXHIBIT II 
Essential Elements of Information 
Name of Competitor Company 
Headquarters Address 
Major events; acquisitions; divestitures; mergers 
Overseas investments 
Industry reputation 
Corporate culture: past, present, continuity 
II. Business/Product Mix 
Five year segment analysis: sales/profits/investments 
Major products: market share/market growth 
III. Major Corporate Objectives/Strategies 
IV. Recent Trends/Business Developments 
V. Financial Analysis: Five Year Comparisons with Industry/Business Norms 
Sales growth 
Profit growth 
Return on assets 
Asset turnover 
Operating margin 
Net margin 
Return on equity 
Debt ratio 
VI. Strategic Assessment 
Strengths/weaknesses: functional and operational 
Strategic direction/management assumptions 
Expected performance/responsive capability 
Implications to competitor and company 
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EXHIBIT HI 
Online Sources of Competitor Inf orma tion 
Textual Files for Industry Analysis 
Database Features Format 
ABI/INFO RM Administration Business management Abstracts 
Arthur D. Little Online Industry forecasts Full text 
Product/market overviews 
Management commentaries 
Public opinion surveys 
Technology assessments 
Industry Data Sources Market research Abstracts 
Economic forecasts 
Investment banking 
Inf oma t In terna tional Business Product/market overviews Abstracts 
Economic forecasts 
Company news 
New products/technologies 
Investext Management profiles Full text 
Sales/earnings 
Market share 
R&D expenditures 
Management Contents Marketing Abstracts 
Operations research 
Industrial relations 
Organizational behavior 
PTS F&S Indexes Mergers & acquisitions Abstracts 
New products 
Sociopolitical factors Technological 
Developments 
PTS MARS Ad vertising/mar keting A bstracts/ta bular 
Exhibit III (continued) 
Database 
PTS New Product Announcements/ 
PLUS 
PTS PROMT/PTS PROMPT DAILY 
Trade & Industry 
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Features 
Product press releases 
Mergers & acquisitions 
Litigation 
Contracts 
New facilities 
Mergers & acquisitions 
Mar keting/ ad vertising 
New products/technology 
Production 
N ational/regionaljlocal 
Index/ASAP 
Business news 
Databases for Industry News 
Database Features 
AP News In terna tional/na tional/ 
business news 
Business Dateline Regional business news 
Businesswire Business press releases 
McGraw-Hill News Business announcements 
Mergers & acquisitions 
New products 
Moody's Corporate News--U.S./ Business announcements 
In terna tional Earnings 
Balance sheets 
Newsearch Execu ti ve / corpora te news 
Product reviews 
Newspaper Abstracts Regional business news 
Format 
Full text 
Abstracts 
Full text 
Format 
Full text 
Full text 
Full text 
Full text 
Abstracts/tabular 
Full text 
Abstracts 
Exhibit III (continued) 
Database 
PR Newswire 
Reuters 
Standard & Poor's News 
UPI News 
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Features 
Mergers & acquisitions 
Earnings 
Litigation 
Business news releases 
International trade 
Government statistics 
Interim earnings 
Executive/corporate changes 
Contract awards 
Business news releases 
Company Directory Databases 
Database Features 
Corporate Affiliations Business description 
Corporate history 
Of f icers/ directors 
Disclosure Business description 
Financial statements 
Of f icers/ directors 
Litigation 
Disclosure/Spectrum Ownership Stock holdings 
Trading information 
Dun's Electronic Yellow Pages Headquarters addresses 
Branch locations 
Execu ti ves/ off icers 
Dun's Financial Records Business ratios 
Balance sheets 
Income statements 
Corpora te history 
Format 
Full text 
Full text 
Abstracts 
Full text 
Format 
Tabular 
Tabular 
Tabular 
Tabular 
Tabular 
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Exhibit III (continued) 
Database Features Format 
Dun's Market Identifiers Business description Tabular 
Products 
Officers 
M&A Filings Business description Abstracts 
Corporate history 
Transaction data 
Media General Plus Stock data Tabular 
Balance sheets 
Income sta temen ts 
Business ratios 
Million Dollar Directory Business description Tabular 
Of f i cers / directors 
Moody's Corporate Profiles Business description Tabular 
Financial histories 
Statistical records 
Capitalization 
Standard & Poor's Corporate Business description Tabular 
Descriptions Corporate history 
Capitaliza tion 
Earnings/finances 
Standard & Poor's Register Officers/ directors Full text 
Biographical 
Standard & Poor's Register Business description Full text/tabular 
Corporate Off icers/ directors 
Earnings/finances 
Thomas New Industrial Products New products Tabular 
Trade names 
Thomas Register Products Tabular 
Trade names 
Business description 
Sales 
Trinet Company Business description Tabular 
Sales 
Exhibit III (continued) 
Database 
Trinet Establishment 
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Features 
Business description 
Sales 
Market share 
Format 
Tabular 
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EXHIBIT IV 
Government Sources of Competitor Information 
Federal Government 
Source 
Commerce Department 
Congress 
Consumer Product Safety Commission 
En vironmen tal Protection Agency 
Federal Trade Commission 
Geological Survey 
Internal Revenue Service 
International Trade Commission 
Labor Department 
National Institute for Occupational 
Safety & Health 
National Labor Relations Board 
Office of Technology Assessment 
Patent & Trademark Office 
Security and Exchange Commission 
Information 
Industry analyses 
Ind ustry statistics 
Legislative hearing records/testimonies 
Investigations of companies/products 
complaint reports/corrective actions 
Industrywide environmental studies 
Industrywide studies 
Investigations of antitrust matters 
Aerial maps of facilities 
Aggregate industry data 
Tax returns of non-profit organizations 
Studies of industries threatened by 
foreign competition 
Industrywide employment figures 
Reports of working conditions/labor 
training 
Companies/industries with potentially 
Hazardous work conditions 
Labor dispute records 
Studies of effects of new/emerging 
Technologies 
Patents/trademarks 
Company information 
Financial data 
Biographical data of executives 
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Exhibit IV (continued) 
State Government 
Source 
Attorney General's Office 
Commerce Office 
Highway Authority 
Labor Office 
Legisla ture 
Occupa tional/Prof essional Licensing 
Occupational Safety and Health Office 
Purchasing Office 
Secretary of State's Office 
Securities Office 
Information 
Consumer complaints/in vestiga tions 
Company prosecution records 
Plant locations 
Industry trends/statistics 
State manufacturers directories 
Aerial maps of facilities 
Labor conditions 
Labor statistics by industry 
Legisla tive hearings/testimonies 
Qualification records of professionals 
Job safety inspection records 
State/company contract records for 
goods and services 
Articles of incorporation 
Notices of mergers/acquisitions 
Company annual reports 
Uniform Commercial Code filings/ 
financial data 
Prospectuses of stock offered only 
wi thin the state 
Local Government 
Source Inf orma tion 
Building Department Building permits 
Building inspection records 
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Exhibit IV (continued) 
Source 
Consumer Protection Agency 
County /City Clerk 
Health Department 
Planning Department 
Property /Tax Assessor 
Information 
Records of complaints/investigations 
In to companies, services, products 
Real estate deeds 
Mortgage agreements 
Health inspection records 
Development permits 
Loan guarantees 
Property values 
Property /building descriptions 
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EXHIBIT V 
Field Sources of Competitor Information 
Source 
Chambers of Commerce 
Citizens Groups 
College Alumni Associations 
Courts 
Credit Reporting/Bond Rating 
Labor Unions 
Newspapers 
Trade/Professional Associations 
Information 
Business and executive information 
Consumer complaints 
Better business bureau in vestiga tion 
reports 
Consumer / en vironmen tal in vestiga tion 
studies 
Executive profiles 
Records of lawsuits filed by or against 
companies 
Records of criminal prosecution 
Bankruptcy records 
Company profiles 
Labor relations 
U nioniza tion 
Work conditions 
Articles about companies/executives 
Business conditions 
Lists of members 
Company /industry studies 
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EXHIBIT VI 
Intelligence Audit Interview Guide 
1. What are the major responsibilities of interviewee? 
2. To whom does (s)he report? 
3. With what groups does (s)he interface regularly? 
4. What decisions does (s)he make and what reports are written? 
5. What information is needed to make these decisions and for which reports? 
6. What is the most useful information received? From whom? 
7. How does the information get to interviewee? 
8. What are interviewee's contacts in the industry and are they sources of 
information? 
9. Does interviewee supply information to others in the organization? To whom? 
10. What changes could be made to help interviewee get better intelligence and how 
would (s)he rate the intelligence presently being received with respect to 
adequacy, validity, reliability, volume, and timeliness? 
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EXHIBIT VII 
Intelligence Awareness Briefing Agenda 
General Background 
Explanation of competitor intelligence effort 
Explanation of the importance of competitor intelligence 
Essential Items of Information 
List of targets and priorities 
Examples of particular items of interest which collectors should look for 
Sources of Information 
Potential sources of intelligence and solicitation of ideas 
Field Collection Techniques 
Legal/ethical issues of intelligence collection 
Basics of intelligence collection and field interviews 
Counterintelligence and security issues 
Field Intelligence Reporting 
Discussion of how, to whom, and when to communicate intelligence through formal 
channels 
Discussion of how to establish source reliability 
Incentives 
Discussion of implementation of incentive system 
Discussion of providing feedback 
Scope and Type 
Specific topic 
User request 
Descriptive/responsive 
Short deadline 
Purpose 
Satisfy ad hoc intelligence needs 
Fill in minor information gaps 
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EXHIBIT VIII 
Spot Intelligence 
Quick dissemination of secondary information 
Any 
Audience 
User-defined 
Format 
Short memo 
Telephone conversation 
Scope and Type 
Broad 
Background 
Strategic/opera tional 
Descripti ve / analytical 
Purpose 
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EXHIBIT IX 
Base Case Intelligence 
Outline competitor's organization; performance; strengths; vulnerability; strategic 
direction 
Stra tegic/operational 
Audience 
Planning, marketing, and financial analysts 
Format 
Working file 
Detailed research report 
Limited distribution 
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EXHIBIT X 
Base Case Intelligence File 
Strategic Background 
1. Overall competitive position within core industry 
General reputation 
Management reputation 
Major qualitative strengths 
Major qualitative weaknesses 
2. Comparative financial performance (last five years) 
Profitability trend versus industry averages 
Sales margin 
Asset turnover 
Return on operating assets 
Key growth rates 
Sales 
Profit margins 
Capital structure, earning pattern, stock performance 
3. Business portfolio analysis/investment strategy 
Product mix by segment 
Distribution of operating assets by segment 
Comparative analysis of segment financial performance 
Sales and profitability trends 
Funds deployment trends (funds used/funds generated) 
4. Geographic balance 
Domestic versus international 
Foreign subsidiaries 
Exhibit X (continued) 
5. Corporate culture and history 
Historical perspecti ve 
Growth pattern 
Developmen t milestones 
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Core organizational values and business mission 
Managerial/ opera tional style 
Corporate Strategy 
1. Announced objectives and strategies 
2. Inferred goals 
Domestic 
In terna tional 
3. Past strategies 
Consistency 
Continuity 
4. Short term-long term constraints and tradeoffs 
5. Competitors' reaction 
6. Planning and implementation capabilities 
7. Capital investment program 
8. Acquisition and divestment pattern 
9. Relative emphasis on growth through acquisition versus interval development 
Business-Unit Strategies 
1. Products/market share rank/demand assumptions 
2. Capabilities, goals, actions 
3. Relationship to corporate strategy 
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Exhibit X (continued) 
Joint Ventures 
1. Type and purpose 
2. Trends 
Functional Analyses 
1. Sales and marketing 
Key products, market share, commitment 
Product quality, client reputation 
Pattern of product introduction 
Pricing tactics 
Distribution 
Sales force caliber/reputation 
Market research capability 
Technical service 
Major accounts/key clients 
Mar keting image 
Overall 
Key businesses 
Key products 
2. Opera tions 
Competitive cost position 
Geographic 
Major prod uct lines 
Facilities profile 
Locations 
Numbers of employees 
Expenditure patterns 
3. Financial 
Overall financial management ability 
Credit ratings, borrowing capacity 
Lender relationships 
Business growth and development funding strategies 
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Exhibit X (continued) 
4. Organizational 
Senior management control/decision-making process 
Corpora te structure 
Line operations/supporting staff 
Business units/product lines 
Global/country teams 
Cen traIiza doni decen traliza tion 
Congruence with corporate values 
Informal structure and sources of influence 
Dominant functions 
Strongest business units 
Human resources/personnel strategies 
Employee talent; morale; turnover; productivity 
Management 
1. Overall reputation and accomplishments 
Background, experience, functional orientation 
Flexi bili ty I ada pta bili ty 
2. CEO profile 
Abilities, tenure, reputation 
Succession 
3. Other key decision-makers 
Dominant role models 
Sources of influence 
4. Depth and continuity 
5. Outside board of directors 
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Exhibit X (continued) 
Strategic Net Assessment 
1. Capabilities/weakness recap 
Best at/worst at .- operations and functions 
Trends, capacity for change 
2. Evaluation of perceived strategy 
Management commitment 
Coherence and consistency 
Congruence with managements' assumptions; industry trends; business unit 
strategies; stated corporate goals 
Financial ability 
Match between company capabilities and strategic objectives 
Timing and implementation problems 
Probability of success (expected performance) 
3. Probable competitive reactions and company response 
4. Strategic implications for company 
Threats 
Opportuni ties 
New issues 
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EXHIBIT XI 
Periodic Intelligence 
Scope and Type 
Focused on key indica tors 
Communicates essential elements of information 
Descriptive report 
Purpose 
Monitor and track competitor activities and trends 
Identify new essential elements of information and indicators 
Provide quick summary of comparative performance 
Updates base case intelligence 
Provides common frame of reference on competitors 
Opera tional! stra tegic 
Audience 
Senior management, line management, analysts 
Format 
Written report in brief summary format 
Maximum use of matrices, tables, and graphs 
Minimal analysis 
Wide distribution 
Scope and Type 
Broad synthesis 
Action oriented 
Strategic 
Reasoned extrapolation 
Purpose 
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EXHIBIT XII 
Strategic Net Estimates 
Delineate competitor's strategy, means, and objectives 
Profile strategic assets and vulnerabilities 
Assess strategic threats and opportunities 
Provide comparative framework for competitive analysis 
Outline competitor's self-appraisal of its position, performance, and potential 
Forecast competitor's probable and alternate courses of action 
Strategic 
Audience 
Senior management 
Format 
Component of strategic plans 
Specialized briefing and/or written report profiling competitor's strategies 
Limited distribution 
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